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Foreword
London’s population is expected to grow to 10 million in 
the next 10 years, adding the equivalent of a Birmingham 
and a Manchester to the capital. The biggest existential 
threat arising from London’s growth is the lack of 
housing, particularly homes that are ‘affordable’ for 
ordinary working Londoners. The fear is this will strangle 
the city’s ability to grow and damage its economy. Some 
companies are considering creating their own ‘affordable’ 
homes for employees to keep staff they need.
Yet there are few indicators that the ‘affordability’ of 
London’s homes is set to improve in this timescale 
without radical intervention – which is why the role of 
Dolphin Living in providing subsidised ‘intermediate’ 
rented homes is important. And this is why we want to 
understand more about the contribution people who have 
been called ‘key workers’ make to London’s economy.
In 2014 we asked the University of Westminster to carry 
out a cost-benefit analysis of our first completed key 
worker development in Westminster in central London. 
Their report concluded the benefit to London’s economy 
for each affordable home provided at One Church Square 
in Pimlico was ‘more than £19,000 per annum’. 
Since then we’ve developed a number of new schemes 
and we’ve asked the University to revisit its findings 
and update its work by looking at the 141 households 
that we have accommodated in two new schemes, one 
in Soho and one at King’s Cross. We also asked the 
University to consider a question we were frequently 
asked after the first piece of research, which was ‘why 
deliver key worker housing in the centre of London 
when it’s so expensive?’. 
So we also asked the team to look at another Dolphin 
Living scheme, the New Era estate in Hackney, where 
we’ve introduced an innovative income based rent 
scheme – called ‘Personalised Rents’ - to see if there 
is a better way for boroughs to define ‘affordable rents’ 
when they negotiate planning agreements (called S106 
agreements) to avoid ‘over-subsidising’ some of the 
tenants – which we believe the current arrangements 
enable. This would help make more resources available 
to create more affordable homes.
This new research shows: 
1 The economic value of providing discounted rental 
housing to key workers is, on average, £27,000 per 
household. From this we have deducted the cost of 
providing it of c.£14,000. The net benefit to London’s 
economy per household is at least £12,500 per annum.
2 Although it is marginally cheaper to provide key 
worker housing in outer boroughs, there are significant 
costs to be offset – transport, time, etc, and these 
almost negate the benefits of doing so. And because 
costs of housing in outer boroughs are rising so 
quickly, the differential is disappearing. Wherever we 
look across London there is a problem of ‘affordable’ 
living. If we wish to avoid the ‘doughnut’ effect – 
evident in Paris – where the workforce is ‘ghetto-ised’ 
in an outer suburban ring, we need to make provision 
for key workers across London. Failure to do this will 
have serious implications for the London economy.
3 The approach to fixing rents in S106 agreements 
typically over-subsidises a percentage of tenants who 
could afford to pay more. A personalised rent model, 
which we have applied at the New Era Estate would be 
more cost effective and allow more key worker housing 
to be created.
The ‘Squeezed Middle’ problem and resulting skills 
shortages have been well documented by others, 
notably the CBI, London First, the Peabody Trust, 
Centre for London and the Resolution Foundation. 
We believe there are answers. The London Land 
Commission is compiling a database of public land that 
can be developed for homes. The new Mayor Sadiq 
Khan has instructed Transport for London to make 
its underused land available for development. New 
policies are being considered to encourage the rented 
sector and there is an estimated £30bn of institutional 
money earmarked for rented property. 
One big obstacle is the higher land value that 
development of for-sale homes commands compared  
to for-rent. If a significant amount of the land that comes 
forward could be designated for development ONLY for 
rental products (market and discounted rents) then this 
would attract investment from long-term investors, who 
have stated their interest, and who, given access to  
the land, would build and let the housing at the scale, 
and to the quality, that London desperately needs. 
We do not need more homes for sale. We need homes 
for working Londoners. 
The Mayor and central government can make this 
happen if they change thinking around what is really 
‘best value’ for London when public land is sold. We 
think this research helps make the case for that change. 
Jon Gooding
Chief Executive
Dolphin Living
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Executive Summary
This report presents a variety of evidence on the economic and social 
challenges London has faced over the past two decades, and considers  
the implications for future housing policy. 
Our focus is on the provision of Discounted Rental 
Accommodation in London, and its potential to mitigate 
negative impacts arising from a continued increase 
in costs of accommodation, that far outstrips wage 
growth for a ‘squeezed’ middle of workers. The study 
builds on findings from a previous report that began this 
programme of research, and we are grateful for continued 
funding from Dolphin Living (DL).
Within the economic literature it is recognised that the 
value of an individual worker’s productive contribution 
is not always fully reflected in the value of the wage 
they earn. For instance, the wage of teachers is much 
lower than the productive contribution they make to the 
economy – their work is associated with a high ‘positive 
externality’ or ‘spillover’. This also applies to nurses and 
other public sector ‘key’ workers – their value to the 
London economy is much higher than their wage and as 
a result, we argue that DL developments help tackle this 
implied market failure. 
When considering the additional teachers, nurses and 
other public sector workers in DL funded developments, 
the calculations of researchers provide estimates of the 
value to the London economy and society, of overcoming 
these market failures. A key part of the value added from 
DL developments is the fact that, when compared to the 
counterfactual state of the world (which we create using 
Labour Force Survey data), there are higher proportions of 
these ‘key’ workers whose value to the London economy 
is much greater than their remuneration. The provision 
of accommodation to these key workers, changes the 
local labour market mix to include individuals who have a 
higher value to the London economy, even if their wage 
does not reflect this. In addition to these public sector 
workers, there are a number of occupations in the private 
sector which are also of much greater value to the London 
economy than their earnings would suggest.
For instance, those working in London’s Mainstream 
Cultural Attractions provide an essential service to 
the London economy. An individual who contributes 
to the successful run of a sell-out show will make a 
contribution well beyond the immediate takings at the 
box office – their work will lead to increased revenues 
from surrounding businesses, it will likely make some 
contribution to the reputation of London as a cultural 
centre, having a positive impact on tourism and also 
acting to draw in more individuals to work and live in 
London. Because these individuals are paid well below 
their true value to the economy, economic theory 
would suggest an expansion of their numbers; but 
exactly the opposite has happened, as the steep rise in 
housing costs has made the wages on offer even less 
attractive.
We classify the following as ‘key workers’ amongst 
London’s squeezed middle, and find that 52% of DL 
residents fall into this category of key worker:
• Teachers, Nurses and Emergency Service workers. 
• Those working in areas that fuel London’s Creativity, 
Innovation and ‘New Movements’ who are essential 
for the success of developments such as Inner East 
London’s Tech City.
• Those working to support London’s Mainstream 
Cultural Attractions.
• Those working in London’s public services outside 
of Health and Education (Civil Servants) and those 
working in the Charitable Sector.
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The Estimated Benefits of Dolphin 
Living in King’s Cross and Soho
We estimate the economic impact arising from DL 
developments at King’s Cross (N1) and Hopkins 
Street (Soho), based on these economic arguments. 
The estimates are created for 214 tenants, resident 
in 77 apartments at the King's Cross location and 64 
apartments at the Hopkins Street (Soho) location. 
The suggestion from our model is that 141 units (for 
214 tenants) in DL developments at King’s Cross and 
Soho, provide a benefit of £3.8 million per annum. 
This includes consideration of the negative impact of 
£554,000 arising from lower incomes associated with 
a less affluent distribution of occupations, and the 
potential for a percentage of units to remain partially 
occupied for a large part of the year under the market-
rental scenario. 
Calculating the annual revenue that would accrue 
from rents charged by DL, the implied subsidy is 
approximately £2 million and this gives an estimated 
benefit-to-cost ratio of 1.9 for Dolphin Living 
developments. It is important to note that the costs 
used here, cover 100% of the 214 DL residents; but 
the benefit is calculated for only 52% of residents who 
we identify as key workers. Therefore, we can consider 
that the benefit-to-cost ratio for Dolphin Living 
developments lies somewhere between 1.9 and 3.7. 
Anything over 2 is considered as ‘high value’ by the 
National Audit Office. 
London’s Squeezed Middle
Exact definitions of the ‘squeezed middle’ vary 
according to the topic under scrutiny, and the 
perspective from which the issue is approached. The 
Resolution Foundation was one of the first bodies to 
systematically analyse this concept, and considers 
households earning just below median incomes 
across the UK (Resolution Foundation, 2013; page 5). 
More specifically, they define the squeezed middle as 
households with incomes between the 10th and 50th 
percentiles, who do not receive more than 20% of their 
income from benefits – they suggest that this group 
continue to experience a squeeze on living standards, 
and here we argue that this is particularly so for the 
equivalent range of households in London. 
Our estimate of value added from DL developments 
derives from the value that ‘key workers’ in the 
squeezed middle bring to the London economy, 
and we do not consider any value from [the 48%] of 
workers in DL developments who are part of the wider 
squeezed middle, but who are not considered as ‘key’. 
We argue that this represents a cautious approach 
to evaluation, as many of these other workers will be 
residents in the local borough, and one can argue that 
there are social benefits to provision of discounted 
rental accommodation. One reason for our caution, 
is that estimates of such social benefits are scarce. 
However, it is also based on the literature that details 
the decline in demand for many ‘mid-skill’ jobs, that 
have typically been associated with those in the middle 
of the income distribution – a phenomenon that has 
been described as a ‘hollowing out’ of the labour 
market (McIntosh, 2013). 
Many commentators make a case for some form 
of support to this wider squeezed middle, outside 
of those who are ‘key’ workers. However, the 
lack of empirical evidence on the benefits of such 
interventions, and the decline in demand for many 
‘mid-skill’ jobs, leads us to concentrate on the value of 
key workers in this group. 
Demographics and Housing in 
Central, Inner and Outer London 
Our approach to analysis of the value of discounted 
rental accommodation uses a ‘local’ counterfactual, 
and this allows us to estimate how much an 
intervention changes the ‘mix’ of local labour supply. 
We argue that the current cost of accommodation is 
leaving an increasing number of key workers locked 
out of the local labour market, and we can value the DL 
intervention by considering how much they boost the 
supply of these key workers, by comparison with the 
existing mix of working residents. However, one could 
argue that we should boost supply of our key workers 
(i.e. alter the labour supply mix available to London’s 
employers) by moving them to accommodation in 
Outer London. 
Our analysis of occupation and industry sector 
using Labour Force Survey data, shows that this is 
already happening to a certain extent, with those 
in occupational groups below professional and 
managerial level being squeezed further and further 
out of the centres, and away from areas with good 
transport links. One could argue that there is no need 
to change the ‘local’ labour force mix in Central/Inner 
London (to boost those whose work has a much wider 
‘unrecognised’ value to London), as there is plenty of 
affordable housing in the Outer regions – perhaps we 
don’t need to change the local labour market mix by 
locating residents in Central/Inner London, because 
the local labour supply mix can be impacted by Outer 
London residents. 
However, our analysis suggests that, the direct costs of 
travel, the opportunity cost of time whilst commuting, 
and the need to secure higher percentage returns 
in less affluent areas of London (i.e. compression of 
yields); tend to offset many of the savings from location 
of workers in cheaper, but less easily accessible, parts 
of London. Whichever area of London we consider the 
challenge remains the same, as any improvements in 
transport infrastructure, have an immediate impact 
on the costs of accommodation. Expanding transport 
infrastructure is essential to the continued success of 
London, but as soon as an area gains better transport 
links, the cost of housing rises, and locks out many of 
the key workers on which the capital depends. 
This is something that needs to be taken into account 
for all those in lower socio-economic groups who are 
steadily being pushed to the periphery. However, this 
study is particularly concerned with individuals in our 
key skill groups – the quality of life associated with a 
long commute will simply not be sufficient to justify 
working in London as a teacher, nurse, theatre worker, 
software analyst etc. The contribution of these workers 
to London is essential, but the wedge between their 
value to the capital (much of it not directly captured by 
their employer) and their real wage, will only continue 
to grow, as the cost of ‘living’ in London continues to 
rise [whether this is the ‘cost of living’ associated with 
residence in the expensive centre, with limited direct 
and opportunity costs of commuting; or in the less 
expensive Outer London area, with all the offsetting 
costs of commute]. 
In addition to these compelling economic arguments 
for interventions [including discounted rental 
developments] that accommodate key workers in 
London’s squeezed middle, this discussion taps 
into a wider concern. Our analysis of ward-level LFS 
data highlights the continued squeezing of resident 
populations who are not working at the very top of 
the occupational ladder (whether or not they are key 
workers). Whilst there is more occupational variation 
the further we move from the centre; over time, this is 
decreasing in all areas. We are steadily seeing a move 
towards more and more Inner London areas exhibiting 
the same characteristics of the Central region; and this 
is also spreading to Outer London. 
These trend occupational changes are apparent in 
the rest of the UK, but in London they have become 
‘super-charged’, as the rising cost of accommodation, 
re-enforces an increasing geographic segregation 
according to socio-economic group. One can see 
improved transport links as part of the solution, and 
we must pursue these. However, any area that obtains 
significant improvements in transport links, experiences 
a relative increase in the costs of accommodation 
that pushes out those on lower incomes. The process 
is dynamic and constantly changing, and what is 
‘affordable’, similarly, constantly changes. However, 
the impact is the same, as it increases geographic 
segregation by occupation (and therefore education 
and other indicators of ‘difference’); re-enforcing the 
geographic differences that we saw in voting patterns 
following the June 23rd referendum. 
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A Personalised Rent Model in Dolphin 
Living Developments
The approach being adopted by DL at the New Era 
Estate uses the Minimum Income Standard (MIS) 
developed by the Joseph Rowntree Foundation 
(with Loughborough University) [JRFMIS]. For each 
household type, this allows DL to calculate the 
minimum household budget required to achieve an 
acceptable standard of living; they can then compare 
this to the net income of the household; and a 
proportion of the remaining difference (or ‘Residual 
Income’) is set as the rent. 
Our approach is to use existing information on the 141 
tenant households that form the focus of our analysis; and 
estimate the revenue from rental income if a Personalised 
Rent approach were taken. We then compare this to the 
DL intervention scenario under current approaches to 
renting, and consider the implications.
We find that the Personalised Rents approach has 
clear potential to deliver significant Social Benefits, 
by matching rents charged to London’s working 
households, with their ability to pay – another way of 
looking at this, is that current Section 106 agreements 
lead to some amount of over-subsidisation, according 
to the JRFMIS calculations. This is in addition to the 
economic benefits we have detailed elsewhere in the 
report, arising from the accommodation of key workers 
in the squeezed middle. There is a lot more work to be 
done if such an approach is to be implemented, but we 
would suggest that the calculations and discussions 
in this report represent a good starting point for wider 
consideration of this approach and how this could be 
incorporated in Section 106 agreements. 
Conclusions and Policy Recommendations
The approach adopted in this report allows us insight 
into the relative costs of location in different regions 
of London. When we consider moving individuals to 
regions of the capital that have lower average costs 
of accommodation (and therefore require a smaller 
implied subsidy), there are significant offsetting [direct 
and opportunity] costs of commuting. This report 
serves to underline that, wherever we look across 
London, there is a problem of affordable living. In our 
attempts to clarify the location decisions facing those 
who provide discounted rents, we have underlined the 
lack of choice facing many workers, who are at risk of 
being squeezed out of the London labour market. 
The pattern we describe is inevitable in many ways, for 
a city that will hopefully continue to thrive. For those key 
workers who are essential to the continued economic 
success of London, but under-valued because of a 
market failure, there is a strong economic case for 
something to be done. This will go some way to retain 
an amount of diversity in this increasingly segregated 
city, but more importantly it will help ensure that the 
success continues. A city that struggles to attract good 
teachers, nurses, creatives, software analysts and 
others, will find its success under threat. 
The Personalised Rent calculations in this report 
are very much a first step in considering the wider 
implications of such a model for working Londoners. 
The underlying challenge that becomes apparent 
from our calculations, is the need to obtain a balance 
between (i) retaining incentives to effort in the labour 
market and adopting an approach that is acceptable 
to higher income earners; whilst (ii) allowing sufficient 
revenues to provide discounted rents to those who have 
the greatest need. However, this is an approach that DL 
is already implementing on the New Era Estate and the 
response of tenants has been very positive, so this is 
not a wholly ‘academic’ exercise. 
More work needs to be done if the Personalised Rents 
(PerR) approach is to be rolled out generally. However, 
there is clear potential for the adoption of a PerR model 
to allow for the provision of more subsidised housing, 
without negatively impacting on the affordability of 
existing/planned housing. A common theme throughout 
the report is the necessity for an expansion of the 
approaches used in London to tackle problems of 
accommodation, and this report is a first step in tackling 
the lack of discussion around a Personalised Rents 
approach, as part of the raft of measures considered. If 
we are going to support a thriving city, then key workers 
need to be better accommodated; and the implication 
from our calculations, is that a Personalised Rents 
approach may be particularly effective in achieving this 
outcome at minimum cost.
" When we consider moving individuals to regions 
of the capital that have lower average costs of 
accommodation (and therefore require a smaller 
implied subsidy), there are significant offsetting [direct 
and opportunity] costs of commuting. This report 
serves to underline that, wherever we look across 
London, there is a problem of affordable living."
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1. Introduction 
This report presents a variety of evidence on the economic and social 
challenges London has faced over the past two decades, and considers  
the implications for future housing policy. 
Our focus is on the provision of Discounted Rental 
Accommodation in London, and its potential to mitigate 
negative impacts arising from a continued increase in costs 
of accommodation, that far outstrips wage growth for a 
‘squeezed’ middle of workers. The study builds on findings 
from a previous report¹ that began this programme of 
research, and we are grateful for continued funding from 
Dolphin Living (DL). Themes pursued in the current report 
are continuations of issues flagged in the previous study.
First, a key outcome of the previous programme of 
research was the estimation of value added to the 
London economy and society, from a development 
funded by Dolphin Living [One Church Square]. The 
previous report began with a detailed review of the 
London economy, the academic literature that considers 
the economics of agglomeration, and other socio-
economic issues relevant to large global cities. For 
instance, there is an extensive economic literature 
estimating the productive contribution teachers make 
to the wider economy, and the extent to which this 
productivity is not reflected in their earnings. The work of 
teachers is associated with a high ‘positive externality’ 
or ‘spillover’; and this is an argument that also applies 
to nurses, and a range of other public, and private 
sector, workers. These ‘key’ workers have a particularly 
high value to the London Economy, but are increasingly 
squeezed by the widening gap between their wages and 
accommodation costs. Accommodating such workers 
provides a benefit to the London Economy [in addition to 
the direct productivity benefit to their employer] that can 
be estimated from economic data. 
¹ Urwin, P., D’Costa, S., Lister, M., Rich, V. and Hedges, P. (2014), Housing Policy in High Density Global Cities: a Cost Benefit 
Model, Dolphin Square Foundation.
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Section 2 begins with a brief 
summary [in Section 2.1] of 
discussions from the previous study, 
reviewing the academic literature 
to identify key workers who are 
associated with these spillover 
benefits. Section 2.2 then presents 
an estimate of the value of DL 
developments [at King’s Cross and 
Soho], that provide Discounted 
Rental Accommodation to London’s 
squeezed key workers in the private 
and public sectors. This extends our 
previous model, to include a broader 
range of accommodation, which on 
[average] is provided to DL tenants 
at 40% of market rents (varying 
from 25% to 70% depending on the 
specific unit of accommodation). 
Section 2.3 provides a brief 
introduction to the remaining 
aspects of the study, explaining 
how the estimates in Section 2.2 
relate to issues of skills demand, 
and the wider group of workers 
that commentators consider as the 
‘squeezed middle’. In doing so we 
touch upon questions such as, why 
do individual employers not pay for 
this accommodation? 
An outcome of our discussions in 
Section 2.3, is the need to identify 
the changing skills mix in London’s 
‘local’ labour market, over recent 
decades. More specifically, in 
Section 2.2, the estimated value to 
London from Discounted Rental Accommodation [DRA] 
is based on the fact that DRA alters the skills mix in the 
local labour market - by accommodating key workers. 
This raises questions of what we mean by the ‘local’ 
labour market; how the skills mix has been changing 
across London; and the role of transport infrastructure 
within this context. To begin the process of tackling 
these issues, Section 3 considers the changing patterns 
of occupation and industry sector amongst London’s 
resident working population, since the mid-1990s, when 
the cost of housing started to accelerate. 
The analysis in Section 3 describes socio-economic 
changes separately across the Central, Inner and 
Outer London areas between 1994 and 2014, using 
the quarterly Labour Force Survey. The findings 
from Section 3.1 identify a number of interesting 
demographic shifts in the makeup of London society 
over this twenty-year period. As one might expect, any 
such shifts are most pronounced in Central London, 
where increases in the cost of accommodation have 
been highest. However, we also identify similar 
changes in the makeup of communities in the wider 
Inner, and Outer, London areas, and this provides us 
with interesting insights into what we mean by the 
‘local’ labour market. Section 3.2 then takes this issue 
further, with a key question arising from the previous 
study [of where to locate London’s discounted rental 
accommodation], leading to further clarification on 
the role of transport infrastructure and the challenges 
facing London.
At present DL operates mainly in Central London, in 
some of the most expensive locations in London. The 
value to London of a DL development is in housing 
workers whose productive contribution may be lost to 
the wider London economy - i.e. by changing the local 
skills mix (where ‘local’ covers at least the Inner London 
area). We therefore consider where these workers are 
best accommodated, in and around London. Section 
3.2 sets out three broad options for location; in an area 
where housing barriers are ‘extreme’ (mainly Central 
London); an area where housing barriers are ‘high’ 
(a broader Inner London area, outside of the Centre) 
and then key parts of the Outer London region. The 
discussion provides a broad overview of the trade-offs 
we might expect from location of workers in different 
regions of London, and begins to uncover the fact that 
affordable housing is a problem faced in many areas of 
London, not just the centre.
Section 4 considers one approach that may help with 
some of the challenges identified in previous sections. 
A Personalised Rent (PerR) model takes into account 
the amount of disposable income required by each 
household to achieve an acceptable standard of living 
(as defined by the Joseph Rowntree Foundation), and 
charges a rent based on this. This is a newly emerging 
area for policy consideration, and little has been written 
on this issue – what has been written does not take 
a quantitative approach to consideration of impacts. 
Section 4 considers the implications for DL if it were to 
adopt this approach across its developments.
Section 5 brings together key findings from various 
sections of the report, concludes and presents 
recommendations. At a time when the new mayor is 
formulating an approach to the housing challenge, 
the current study provides important new evidence. A 
particular focus of discussion in Section 5 is the issue 
of Section 106 Agreements.
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2. Estimating the Value of  
Dolphin Living Developments
The 2014 report began by considering the range of economic and  
social challenges that face large global cities such as London and  
the implications these have for housing policy.  
The report identified five areas of the economy, 
critical to London’s future economic growth. Section 
2.1 summarises the assumptions that underpin our 
estimation of economic value from DL developments, 
arising from discussion of these economic and social 
challenges. Section 2.2 then sets out the estimated 
benefit arising from DL developments across the King’s 
Cross and Soho areas. Section 2.3 concludes with 
a consideration of key issues that form the focus of 
discussion from Section 3 onwards.
2.1 What are the Economic Benefits  
of a Dolphin Living Development?
Within the economic literature it is recognised that the 
value of an individual worker’s productive contribution 
is not always fully reflected in the value of the wage 
they earn. For instance, Harvard University’s Prof. Eric 
Hanushek (2010) has estimated the Economic Value of 
Higher Teacher Quality; showing that a small increase 
in teacher quality leads to substantial increases in the 
discounted future lifetime earnings of the children they 
teach. However, the wage of these teachers is much 
lower than the productive contribution they make to 
the economy – their work is associated with a high 
‘positive externality’ or ‘spillover’. This also applies to 
nurses and other public sector ‘key’ workers – their 
value to the London economy is much higher than their 
wage ² and as a result, we argue that DL developments 
help tackle this implied market failure. What do we 
mean by ‘market failure’?
Generally, economic theory suggests that when the 
price of a good or service is equal to the [marginal] 
cost of producing it, or when the wage of a worker is 
equal to the [marginal] benefit to the firm, of employing 
them, then the market is acting effectively to allocate 
scarce resources to the correct productive activities 
(a situation where there is no market failure). If there 
are activities that provide a much higher value to 
the economy than the current cost of doing so, the 
implication is that we should expand these activities ³, 
until the [marginal] cost equals the [marginal] benefit. 
When considering the additional teachers, nurses 
and other public sector workers in DL funded 
developments, the calculations of Hanushek and 
others provide estimates of the value to the London 
economy and society, of overcoming these market 
failures. A key part of the value added from One 
Church Square was the fact that, when compared 
to the counterfactual state of the world ⁴ (which we 
created using Labour Force Survey data), there are 
² There is often a wage premium associated with working in London, but in most sectors this is inadequate to compensate for the 
higher costs of accommodation and/or to internalise any externalities.
³ In this case, efficiency is achieved when the wage [w] equals the Marginal Revenue Product of a worker. Our suggestions 
remain valid, when considering theories of wage setting that recognise an amount of market failure arising from asymmetric 
information, such as efficiency wages, the concept of incomplete contracts and the idea of wage posting. Effort cannot be 
effectively monitored/measured for most individuals – if all the students, or parents of students, knew the value of a good teacher 
(and could identify them) they could pay more. Efficiency wage arguments may be even more pertinent when productivity is hard 
to capture and dispersed amongst many beneficiaries.
⁴ That is, our estimate of what the distribution of occupations would be at One Church Square if DL were not providing 
discounted rental accommodation – hence counterfactual, as it is ‘counter’ to the ‘factual’ state of the world
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2.2 The Estimated Benefits of Dolphin 
Living in Kings Cross and Soho
This section estimates the economic impact arising 
from DL developments at King’s Cross (N1) and Hopkins 
Street (Soho), based on the economic principles set 
out in Section 2.1. The estimates are created for 214 
tenants, resident in 77 apartments at the King's Cross 
location and 64 apartments at the Hopkins Street (Soho) 
location. Table 1 details the rents charged by DL in 
Hopkins Street and King’s Cross, as of September 2016. 
higher proportions of these ‘key’ workers whose value 
to the London economy is much greater than their 
remuneration. The provision of accommodation to 
these key workers, changes the local labour market 
mix to include individuals who have a higher value 
to the London economy, even if their wage does not 
reflect this. 
In addition to these public sector workers, the 2014 
report made the case that a number of occupations 
in the private sector were also of much greater value 
to the London economy than their earnings would 
suggest (one of the key outcomes from the review 
of economic and social challenges facing London). 
For instance, those working in London’s Mainstream 
Cultural Attractions provide an essential service to the 
London economy. The evidence is that individuals are 
drawn to large cities because of the increased demand 
for social interactions (Glaeser et al., 2001; Glaeser and 
Gottlieb, 2006) and cultural attractions are a key part 
of this (not least, as a ‘pull’ for the ‘creative classes’ of 
Richard Florida, 2002, 2003).
Florida and Gates (2001) find that cities with many 
“bohemians” (creative cities) or with large gay 
populations (tolerant cities) innovate more; and this 
is very closely associated with the ‘pull’ of cities as 
centres of consumption. According to Glaeser et 
al (2001) this can happen because there are goods 
and services such as opera or fine restaurants that 
are available in cities but not in rural areas; cities 
act as centres of aesthetic consumption (beautiful 
architecture); and Glaeser et al. (2001) show that high-
amenity cities have grown faster than low-amenity 
cities. Workers engaged in production and support 
of these cultural attractions provide a clear benefit to 
London, that is not reflected in their earnings (because 
it is not captured directly by their employer) – this is 
before we have considered their role in supporting 
tourism revenues. 
An individual who contributes to the successful 
run of a sell-out show will make a contribution well 
beyond immediate takings at the box office – their 
work will lead to increased revenues from surrounding 
businesses, it will likely make some contribution to 
the reputation of London as a cultural centre, having a 
positive impact on tourism and also acting to draw in 
more individuals to work and live in London. Because 
these individuals are paid well below their true value 
to the economy, economic theory would suggest an 
expansion of their numbers; but exactly the opposite 
has happened, as the steep rise in housing costs has 
made the wages on offer even less attractive.
These arguments underpin our development of a 
model that captures the costs and benefits of DL 
developments. Across the public and private sectors, 
there are key workers that provide value to London 
that (i) is essential to the effective functioning of the 
regional economy; but which (ii) is not reflected in 
their earnings; and therefore (iii) is most at risk of 
being underprovided as a result of rising costs of 
accommodation. As we shall see in Section 2.3, these 
workers can be seen as a subset of the wider group, 
who have been described as the ‘squeezed middle’ 
(see for instance, Resolution Foundation, 2013); who 
face rising costs of living, but stagnating wages. 
In addition to these arguments, we also consider 
the literature on ‘economic diversity’. Glaeser et al. 
(1992), Henderson et al. (1995), Combes (2000) and 
Rosenthal and Strange (2003) find that economic 
diversity enhances growth, whilst city specialisation 
fails to do so. This suggests that knowledge spillovers 
are greater across, rather than within, industries and 
that cross-fertilisation of ideas enhances growth (for 
instance diversity increases growth in high-tech firms). 
The evidence suggests that city specialisation does not 
enhance growth while diversity does and this resonates 
strongly in the case of London, where one possible 
scenario going forward is a growing dominance of 
the financial and business services sector to the 
detriment of economic diversity. Economic diversity is 
also considered when calculating the benefits of DL 
development in Section 2.2, but a lack of empirical 
evidence limits its contribution to our estimate of 
benefit from DL developments. 
Table 1: Dolphin Living Gross Rents and Estimated 
Market Equivalences
Hopkins Street
Gross rent 
per week
% of 
Market 
Rent
Distn of 
64 Units
1 Bedroom £171 
£194 
£295
38%
44%
67%
5 
5 
9 
2 Bedrooms £190 
£217 
£307
30%
34%
49%
10 
10 
18 
3 Bedrooms £202 
£234 
£362
25%
29%
44%
2 
2 
3
Kings Cross, N1
Gross rent 
per week
% of 
Market 
Rent
Distn of 
77 Units
Studio £177 52% 25
1 Bedroom £239 58% 25
2 Bedrooms £296
£338
51% 
58%
11 
16
Source: Dolphin Living, September 2016
For instance, when considering Hopkins Street, the 
implied subsidy is highest for the category of 3 bedroom 
units being let at a gross rent of £202 per week, as this 
is only 25% of the market rent for an equivalent property 
in the same borough. The lowest level of implied 
subsidy is associated with the 1 Bedroom units being let 
for £295, as this is estimated at 67% of the market rent. 
For the King’s Cross development, the rents charged 
for all units vary between 51% and 58% of market rents 
charged in the Borough of Camden. 
Section 2.1 identifies a number of occupations in the 
private and public sectors where we are likely to see 
the market underprovide suitably skilled individuals – 
because the wages on offer do not reflect the wider 
economic contribution of these workers, in addition 
to that captured by their employer. Much of the value 
we estimate for DL developments arises because the 
occupational distribution of the 214 tenants contains 
a higher proportion of these private and public sector 
workers ‘key’ to the successful functioning of the 
London economy; who are part of a wider ‘squeezed 
middle’ of workers. We compare the value arising from 
the distribution of occupations in the situation where 
DL provides discounted rental accommodation, to the 
situation we would expect if development of these 
locations were left to the market (with the ‘left to the 
market’ scenario calculated using data from Quarter 1 
of the 2015 Quarterly Labour Force Survey). 
Table 2 shows the occupational distribution of 214 
tenants in the King’s Cross and Soho developments, 
under the current DL approach to rent setting reflected 
in Table 1. For instance, there are 26 Nurses and this 
amounts to 12% of the total resident population; whilst 
the 10 teachers constitute 5% of tenants. There are 48% 
in our category of ‘Other Private sector’ and this reflects 
DL targeting of a range of indicators when considering 
applicants for discounted rental accommodation – which 
means they accommodate a wider range of workers 
from the squeezed middle, not just the ‘key’ workers 
identified here. The focus in this section is on the value 
to London of housing ‘key’ workers within this wider 
squeezed middle group; but we return to consideration 
of the wider group from Section 2.3 onwards.
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Table 2: The Distribution of Occupations in Dolphin Living Developments ⁵
King's Cross (77 flats, 118 tenants) + Hopkins St (64 flats, 96 tenants)
Occupation/Sector Number Percentage
Public Sector
Civil Servants 13 6%
Teacher 10 5%
Education (excluding Teachers) 11 5%
Nurses 26 12%
Health (excluding Nurses) 3 1%
Emergency Sevices 1 0%
Charitable Sector 5 2%
Transport 3 1%
Total Public Sector 72 34%
Private Sector Key workers
Research 6 3%
Mainstream culture (incl. Theatre/West End) 8 4%
Creative (including art, design, etc.) 13 6%
IT (including software development) 13 6%
Total Private Sector Key Workers 40 19%
Other Private Sector
Real Estate, Finance and Business Services 19 9%
Administrator/Assisstant 17 8%
Customer Service 1 0%
Engineering 1 0%
Legal 3 1%
Sales/Marketing 5 2%
Manager 24 11%
Tradesperson 2 1%
Construction 2 1%
Other 24 11%
None 4 2%
Total Other Private Sector 102 48%
Total 214 100%
Source: Dolphin Living, September 2016
⁵ Rounding error means that our 34%, 19% and 48% do not add to 100%
Table 3: Estimated Distribution of Occupations under Market Rents
Estimates of comparable Inner London occupation/industry distribution
Occupation/Sector Number Inner London Percentage
Public Sector
Civil Servants  197,872 11.4%
Teacher  44,028 2.5%
Education (excluding Teachers)  15,535 0.9%
Nurses  34,574 2.0%
Health (excluding Nurses)  23,485 1.3%
Emergency Sevices  5,162 0.3%
Charitable Sector  66,077 3.8%
Transport  9,211 0.5%
Total Public Sector  395,944 22.7%
Private Sector Key Workers
Research  16,948 1.0%
Mainstream culture (incl. Theatre/West End)  32,433 1.9%
Creative (including art, design, etc.)  78,939 4.5%
IT (including software development)  76,329 4.4%
Total Private Sector Key Workers 204,649 11.8%
Other Private Sector
Real Estate, Finance and Business Services  160,334 9.2%
Administrator/Assisstant  146,137 8.4%
Customer Service  26,619 1.5%
Engineering  15,004 0.9%
Legal  40,996 2.4%
Sales/Marketing  146,585 8.4%
Manager  222,310 12.8%
Tradesperson  15,056 0.9%
Construction  28,175 1.6%
Total  1,401,809 81%
Remaining 326,917 19%
Total  1,728,726 100%
Source: Quarterly Labour Force Survey, January-March 2015
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We are likely to observe a different distribution of 
occupations in this DL financed project than if the 
same buildings were provided at market rents, not least 
because of the selection processes that DL implements 
to select tenants. The key question for our analysis is 
therefore, how many teachers, civil servants, nurses, 
software developers, theatre workers and others would 
we expect to see in these 141 apartments if DL were 
not providing the accommodation at discounted rents? 
Table 3 presents our estimate of the occupational 
distribution that we would expect, in the case where 
these 141 apartments were provided at market rents. 
The estimate is created by carrying out an analysis of 
the 1st Quarter 2015 version of the Quarterly Labour 
Force Survey ⁶. We use this survey to produce an 
estimate of what the distribution of occupations/
industries looks like for the Inner London resident 
population, and scale this to 214 working individuals. 
This then constitutes our ‘counterfactual’ scenario – 
that is, the skills mix of the resident population that 
would likely be observed in the state of the world 
where DL does not intervene to provide discounted 
rental accommodation at these two locations ⁷. This  
is the distribution of occupations we would expect 
in the absence of DL, and from this we can create 
estimates of the value that these individuals bring to 
the London economy.
We may expect the [productivity] contribution of those 
resident in DL developments [Table 2] to be greater 
[than Table 3], because we expect more key workers 
to be accommodated, whose value to the London 
economy is much higher than their wage. However, 
working in the opposite direction, one of the potential 
downsides of a DL development is the loss of higher 
earners who would have rented/purchased properties 
in the absence of DL intervention – by definition these 
individuals would have to pay higher housing costs and 
therefore, on average, will have higher earnings (again 
calculated using the 2015 QLFS) ⁸.
Our approach of representing both a DL-rental, and 
Market-rental, scenario allows us to adopt a more 
straightforward framework for analysis ⁹. Readers who 
wish to gain greater insight into the technical detail of 
the model should refer to the 2014 report. However, it 
is important to detail here the evidence underpinning 
our estimation of the value of Externalities, Productivity 
and Spillovers associated with each category of 
worker in Tables 2 and 3; as this is where the majority 
of economic impact comes from, but also where we 
face challenges in identifying appropriate research to 
estimate impacts (especially for key workers in the 
private sector). 
Table 4 summarises the sources underpinning 
our estimates of impact arising from the different 
occupational categories, and the relevant earnings 
estimates. For instance, if we take Hanushek’s most 
conservative estimate for a teacher who, in terms of 
quality, is at the 60th Percentile (slightly above the 
average) with a class of 30 children, the suggestion is 
that this translates into a gain of $158,745 or £96,834.45 
to the children they teach (and therefore society)¹⁰. Thus, 
when we are considering the additional teachers in 
⁶ Office for National Statistics, Social Survey Division and Northern Ireland Statistics and Research Agency, Central Survey Unit, 
Quarterly Labour Force Survey, January - March, 2015. Colchester, Essex: UK Data Archive [distributor]. 
⁷ The counterfactual scenario assumes all residents are in employment (i.e. no economically inactive or unemployed individuals 
resident in the developments). Given the locations being considered this seems justifiable, and errs on the side of caution, as inclusion 
of the unemployed or inactive in our counterfactual, would boost the estimated value added from Dolphin Living intervention. 
⁸ Part of the calculation of counterfactual incomes requires the use of household type (i.e. how many couples we have with children 
etc.) and readers should refer to Urwin et. al. (2014) for more detail on these calculations.
⁹ For instance, we might argue that some consideration needs to be given to disposable income, rather than gross income. However, 
any such considerations apply equally to our discounted rental, and counterfactual, scenarios; and therefore tend to cancel out, when 
considering the net impact. 
¹⁰ The exchange rate used here pre-dates the recent downturn in the value of sterling.
Table 4: Sources of Information and Estimates of Productivity/spillover Impacts
Occupation/Sector Source of estimate Value 
Public Sector
Civil Servants LFS 2013 average earnings multiplied by 3 £70,656
Teachers Hanushek, 2010 (£96,834.45) plus earnings 
multiplied by two
£138,309
Education (excluding Teachers) LFS 2015 average earnings multiplied by two 
(Dearden, Reed & Van Reenen, 2005)
£87,313
Nurses Dall, Chen, Seifert, Maddox and Hogan (2009) 
(£34,099) plus earnings multiplied by two
£93,989
Health (excluding Nurses) LFS 2015 average earnings multiplied by two 
(Dearden, Reed & Van Reenen, 2005)
£54,438
Emergency Sevices LFS 2015 average earnings multiplied by 3 £80,409
Charitable Sector LFS 2015 average earnings multiplied by 3 £80,156
Transport LFS 2015 average earnings multiplied by two 
(Dearden, Reed & Van Reenen, 2005)
£71,547
Private Sector Key workers
Research LFS 2015 average earnings multiplied by 3 £97,704
Mainstream culture (incl. Theatre/West End) LFS 2015 average earnings multiplied by 3 £100,292
Creative (including art, design, etc.) LFS 2015 average earnings multiplied by two 
(Dearden, Reed & Van Reenen, 2005)
£112,848
IT (including software development) LFS 2015 average earnings multiplied by 3 £142,707
Other Private Sector
Real Estate, Finance and Business 
Services
LFS 2015 average earnings multiplied by two 
(Dearden, Reed & Van Reenen, 2005)
£99,315
Administrator/Assisstant LFS 2015 average earnings multiplied by two 
(Dearden, Reed & Van Reenen, 2005)
£46,283
Customer Service LFS 2015 average earnings multiplied by two 
(Dearden, Reed & Van Reenen, 2005)
£36,062
Engineering LFS 2015 average earnings multiplied by two 
(Dearden, Reed & Van Reenen, 2005)
£169,819
Legal LFS 2015 average earnings multiplied by two 
(Dearden, Reed & Van Reenen, 2005)
£57,151
Sales/Marketing LFS 2015 average earnings multiplied by two 
(Dearden, Reed & Van Reenen, 2005)
£52,888
Manager LFS 2015 average earnings multiplied by two 
(Dearden, Reed & Van Reenen, 2005)
£107,959
Tradesperson LFS 2015 average earnings multiplied by two 
(Dearden, Reed & Van Reenen, 2005)
£73,540
Construction LFS 2015 average earnings multiplied by two 
(Dearden, Reed & Van Reenen, 2005)
£55,627
Remaining LFS 2015 average earnings multiplied by two 
(Dearden, Reed & Van Reenen, 2005)
£42,062
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¹¹ It is more accurate to say that these values provide an idea of the ‘scale’ of these external impacts, as the values relate to marginal 
increases in teacher quality, not the actual value of a teacher. 
¹² Dall, T. M., Chen, Y. J., Seifert, R. F., Maddox, P. J., and Hogan, P. F. (2009), “The economic value of professional nursing”, Medical 
Care, Vol. 47, No. 1; pp 97-104; as reported in Keepnews, David. (2013), Mapping the Economic Value of Nursing: A White Paper, 
Seattle: Washington State Nurses Association.
¹³ Again, using an exchange rate that pre-dates the current decline in sterling. 
¹⁴ McIntosh, S. (2011), “Measuring the Economic Impact of Further Education”, Department for Business Innovation and Skills, 
Research Paper No. 38.
¹⁵ Dearden, L., Reed, H., and Van Reenen, J. (2005), “Estimated Effect of Training on Earnings and Productivity, 1983-99”, CEP 
Discussion Papers dp0674, Centre for Economic Performance, LSE.
¹⁶ Our estimate of this value is 10%, which is a conservative take on the findings from Ramidus Consulting Limited (2013), “Taking stock: 
the relationship between Businesses and Office provision in the City”, City of London Corporation, Research Report, March.
¹⁷ See for instance, CBI/CBRE (2016), London Business Survey, February
¹⁸ The real wage is a measure that reflects the purchasing power of the [nominal] wage you receive. It is your nominal wage [w] divided 
by the price level [p]. If the cost of living rises (as represented by the general price level, p) your real wage falls, and this is the situation we 
find ourselves in when costs of accommodation rise.
DL-funded apartments, compared to the counterfactual, 
Hanushek’s calculations give us some indication of the 
value this has to the London economy and society ¹¹.
We are also able to draw on research that calculates 
the external economic value of a nurse¹² where the 
suggestion is that in the US national productivity is 
increased by about $9,900 per year, per additional 
registered nurse (RN) and medical savings are worth 
an average of $46,000 per RN. For each nurse this 
translates into an additional external benefit of $55,900 
or £34,099 in sterling ¹³. Together with nurses and 
teachers, we identify the following ‘key workers’ 
amongst the squeezed middle:
• Those working in areas that fuel London’s 
Creativity, Innovation and ‘New Movements’ who 
are essential for the success of developments 
such as Inner East London’s Tech City.
• Those working to support London’s Mainstream 
Cultural Attractions.
• Those working in London’s public services outside 
of Health and Education (Civil Servants) and those 
working in the Charitable Sector.
However, whilst there seems to be a strong argument 
that providing sub-market rental accommodation to 
these individuals has a value to the London economy, 
there is little specific research to draw on. McIntosh 
(2011)¹⁴ utilises the findings of research from Dearden, 
Reed and Van Reenen (2005)¹⁵ that suggests training 
leads to an increase in productivity that is double the 
increase in earnings. McIntosh (2011)  underlines that 
estimates from Dearden et. al. (2005) ‘consider only 
productivity spillovers at an industry level’, and do not 
take into account wider social and economic benefits. 
Following this research, our cost-benefit model assumes 
that immediate productivity impacts of workers are 
twice their wage, and for teachers/nurses we have the 
above estimates to provide us with some indication of 
the value of spillovers, in addition to this. 
For the other categories of key worker listed above, 
we multiply the wage by three (to take into account the 
additional external value of these jobs to the London 
economy, in addition to productivity impacts that are 
roughly double the wage according to Dearden et. al.). 
This is not ideal, but it should be remembered that we 
are explicitly taking into account the counterfactual in 
these situations and therefore any increase in the scale 
of external impacts also increases the value of our 
counterfactual. In addition, we estimate no figures for 
the economic and/or social value of providing affordable 
rents to the 48% of DL tenants who are in the ‘squeezed 
middle’, but not identified as key workers (an issue to 
which we return).
We estimate the loss of income implied by a less 
affluent occupational distribution in Table 2, compared 
to Table 3, at £554,000 p.a. – a figure that is derived 
using gross incomes, rather than net incomes, and 
therefore may be expected to accentuate this potential 
negative impact from depression of consumption 
expenditures. Similarly, our counterfactual likely 
overstates the proportion of some key occupations, 
because it covers an area that has lower average costs 
of accommodation than the Central London areas. 
Taken together we argue that these approaches, and 
the attributing of value only to key workers, offsets 
concerns over the use of a factor of 3 for occupations 
not covered in the research into externalities.
Having calculated the value of these occupations to 
employers, and the value of spillovers to the wider 
London economy, the suggestion is that 141 units (for 
214 tenants) in DL developments at King’s Cross and 
Soho, provide a benefit of £3.85 million per annum. 
This includes consideration of the negative impact of 
£554,000 arising from lower incomes associated with a 
less affluent distribution of occupations, and the potential 
for a percentage of units to remain partially occupied for a 
large part of the year under the market-rental scenario ¹⁶. 
This figure of £3.85 million marks the starting point 
for analysis in the current study, as we now move on 
to consider the offsetting costs that are incurred by 
DL in achieving this benefit. More specifically, Section 
3.2 estimates the costs that one would likely incur in 
achieving this benefit across the Central, Inner and Outer 
London regions – with the analysis providing insight into 
what we might consider as the ‘local’ labour market, and 
how to view London’s transport infrastructure within this 
context. Section 4 then estimates the costs of providing 
discounted rental provision, if DL were to adopt a 
Personalised Rent model. However, before this, Section 
2.3 considers how our approach relates to wider policy 
debates that encompass the squeezed middle and issues 
of skills demand and supply. 
2.3 London’s Skills demand and  
the Squeezed Middle 
This updating of estimates, to cover a wider range of 
DL developments, leads us to a variety of issues which 
now form the focus of investigation. First, it is important 
to be clear on exactly what our estimates of economic 
impact represent and how they relate to more commonly 
considered questions on skills availability. 
For instance, figures in the London Business Survey, 
(September 2014) suggest that two-thirds of firms 
(66%) reported difficulty recruiting highly skilled 
people, such as IT/technology specialists (20%), 
creative specialists (14%) and finance and engineering 
specialists (12%). The survey also reflects UKCES 
findings that skills shortages continue to be a problem 
for some businesses, as almost half of firms (45%) 
report that not all their staff have the right skills for the 
job. The same research shows that employers aren’t 
able to fill almost a quarter (23%) of all vacancies in 
London due to a lack of applicants with the right skills.
Since these surveys were carried out, the economy has 
slowed. However, the most recent evidence suggests 
that in many of the same areas we have skills demand 
outstripping supply in London¹⁷, and this is unlikely to 
change significantly as a result of increased uncertainty 
following the 23rd June Referendum outcome. In our 
calculation of the benefits of a DL development, this 
evidence may be seen as useful – for instance, the 
shortage of IT/technology and Creative specialists 
provides further support for our suggestion that DL 
developments accommodating individuals from these 
professions, provide a value to the London economy. 
However, we do not necessarily have to observe 
reports of skills shortages in the occupations and 
industries that underpin our estimate of the value of DL 
developments, for these estimates to be valid.
Take the example of an employer who advertises the 
position of Production Manager in the Theatre, at a 
real wage [w/p¹⁸ ]. We can expect the employer to set 
a wage [w] based on calculation of the value that a 
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¹⁹ http://data.london.gov.uk/apps/gla-household-income-estimates/
Production Manager contributes, and the revenues 
they can expect from the show. If they offer a wage 
of [w] and there are no suitable applicants, they can 
consider raising the wage – and would likely be one of 
the employers reporting difficulties recruiting ‘creatives’ 
in skills surveys. We may consider that a Discounted 
Rental development helps to alleviate such problems, 
as it makes [w/p] more attractive by reducing [p].
However, in all of this discussion, the value of [w] 
only reflects the productivity gain to the employer 
from employing the Production Manager. As we have 
already discussed, even if the employer were able to 
fill the position at a wage [w], this would not reflect 
the individual’s true value to the London economy, 
in the case of ‘key’ workers; and considerations of 
economic efficiency would suggest a further expansion 
of employment in this area. 
Because the wage [w] does not reflect the true economic 
value of a job in these situations, there will be too few 
individuals in London supplying their labour to fill such 
posts; and employers will not expand employment up to 
the efficient level, because they do not capture the wider 
benefits that accrue to the London economy. We argue 
that the nature of interventions that provide discounted 
rents act to reduce [p], effectively raising the real wage 
[w/p], and go some way to rectify this market failure. If, in 
addition to this situation, we observe skills shortages in 
some of these key professions, then we may argue that 
skills supply is even further from the ideal (efficient level) 
as it does not even meet existing (sub-optimal) levels of 
demand from employers. 
However, there is an important distinction between these 
market failure and skills shortage arguments; and this 
is best illuminated by answering the question, why do 
employers not provide discounted rental accommodation 
(or simply raise the nominal wage on offer)?
In the case where employers face standard skills 
shortages, it is hard to argue against them bearing the 
cost of a higher real wage; or altering their processes 
to accommodate changing skill and wage relativities. 
In the case of skills shortages, the employer is offering 
a wage that will allow them to achieve a certain level 
of profit (or equivalent in the public sector), and there 
is no suggestion that the employee has a value in 
addition to this direct productivity. In such a situation 
we may argue that the employer either puts up the 
wage or reconsiders their business model. Urwin et. al. 
(2014) discuss this further, considering the potential for 
rising costs of living in the capital to force employers 
to move. This is a concern, if the rising cost of living 
is driven by factors outside the labour market (such as 
the attractiveness of London property as an investment 
vehicle), but it is hard to argue that this represents a 
market failure. In the case where the productive value 
of private and public sector key workers is spread 
across many firms and individuals in London, the 
employer will face no incentive to raise the real wage; 
and we would not expect them to, as they do not stand 
to benefit significantly from any increased employment. 
Finally, it is important to relate our approach to a wider 
literature that considers the ‘squeezed middle’. Exact 
definitions of the squeezed middle vary according to the 
topic under scrutiny, and the perspective from which the 
issue is approached. The Resolution Foundation was one 
of the first bodies to systematically analyse this concept, 
and considers households earning just below median 
incomes across the UK (Resolution Foundation, 2013; 
page 5). More specifically, they define the squeezed 
middle as households with incomes between the 10th 
and 50th percentiles, who do not receive more than 
20% of their income from benefits – they suggest that 
this group continues to experience a squeeze on living 
standards, and here we argue that this is particularly so 
for the equivalent range of households in London. 
For the whole of the UK, the Resolution Foundation 
approach translates into a range of gross annual 
household incomes between £12,000 and £30,000 
for couples without dependents; for single parents 
with two dependents the range is between £13,000 
and £32,000; and for couples with two dependents, 
this is between £17,000 and 41,000. In the Resolution 
Foundation report (2013), the authors suggest that 
close to one third of all working-age households 
fall into the category of ‘squeezed middle’, when 
aggregating across household types in the UK. The 
authors do consider the regional distribution of these 
households and, as one would expect, using these 
income categories to define low-to-middle income 
families, London contains the lowest proportion.
However, for the purposes of this study, we need to 
adopt a different approach, as we wish to consider the 
sort of incomes that place a London household between 
the 10th and 50th percentiles, according to the income 
distribution in London. Answering this question in detail 
is an entire study in itself, but we can use data from the 
Annual Survey of Hours and Earnings [ASHE] (2015) 
and figures provided by the Greater London Authority 
(2012/2013¹⁹ ) to get some idea of the income and 
earnings bands we need to consider when talking of the 
squeezed middle in London, relative to the UK – and 
importantly, some idea of where our key workers sit 
within this group. 
It is important to note limitations of our approach and 
those of existing studies. For instance, a study carried 
out by Leadbetter, Wilson and Theseira (2014; p37) 
suggests that, for London, the equivalent bands are 
£20,000 to £33,000 for working households (not retired) 
who are singles and/or single parents; and for couples 
with dependent children, they suggest a range between 
£25,000 and 43,000. The authors suggest that their 
approach to calculation of London’s squeezed middle 
(or ‘Endies’ as the report calls them), is in line with that 
used by the Resolution Foundation for the UK as a 
whole. However, the authors provide few details of their 
calculations and, importantly, they refer to ‘earnings’, 
rather than ‘income’. The Resolution Foundation bands 
include means-tested benefits (exclusive of tax credits) 
and therefore measure ‘income’, whereas ‘earnings’ 
typically refers to pay from employment. We do not wish 
to get into a detailed discussion over measurement 
issues, but the Leadbetter et. al. (2014) bands seem 
relatively low, when we consider that the median gross 
annual wage for those working in Inner London is 
£34,473, compared to a median of £22,044 for the UK as 
a whole (ONS, 2014). 
Moreover, using the GLA estimates of total Median 
[Gross] Annual Household Income (2012/2013), we can 
see that [as one would expect] any median wage figure 
for Inner London as a whole, hides a lot of variation 
across London boroughs, with Camden having a median 
of £43,750 and Westminster a figure of £47,510. The 
large majority of units in Dolphin Living developments 
cater to households with incomes that are at, or below, 
these median earnings bands for the relevant London 
boroughs where they are located. However, some of the 
most expensive three-bedroom units require much higher 
salaries in the region of £60,000-£70,000. 
As a result, one may perhaps argue that Dolphin Living 
is catering to a slightly higher gross income band 
than that typically taken as the ‘squeezed middle’. 
However, as we have already suggested, the key 
parameter here is real earnings. In London the rising 
cost of accommodation means that even median gross 
earnings in many boroughs are now wholly inadequate. 
Thus it seems reasonable to consider a higher upper 
limit to our income bands than those suggested by 
other commentators, when defining London’s squeezed 
middle. Even without this extension upwards, it is clear 
that a range of key workers fall squarely within the 
squeezed middle of working Londoners. For instance, 
in Inner London, an individual teacher on the Upper 
Pay Ranges, will have gross earnings between £42,756 
and £46,365; whilst even Leading Practitioners, at 
the very top of the top pay scale, will be on £65,978. 
In contrast, a Registered Nurse in London earns an 
average gross salary of £24,458 per year and the range 
of these salaries does not go much above £40,000. 
In this report our estimate of value added from DL 
developments derives from the value that key workers 
in this squeezed middle bring to the London economy, 
and we do not estimate any value from the 48% of 
workers in DL developments who are part of the wider 
squeezed middle, but who are not considered as ‘key’. 
We argue that this represents a cautious approach 
to evaluation, as many of these other workers will be 
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residents in the local borough, and one can argue that 
there are social benefits to provision of discounted 
rental accommodation. One reason for our caution, 
is that estimates of such social benefits are scarce. 
However, it is also based on the literature that details 
the decline in demand for many ‘mid-skill’ jobs, that 
have typically been associated with those in the middle 
of the income distribution – a phenomenon that has 
been described as a ‘hollowing out’ of the labour 
market (McIntosh, 2013). 
To summarise the hollowing out phenomenon, 
there has been a steady decline in the proportion of 
individuals working in intermediate/administrative 
occupations over recent decades; as technological 
innovations and increasing globalisation have led to 
declining demand in occupations where tasks can 
be easily automated and/or outsourced. This has 
depressed wages and limited job opportunities in 
this intermediate, mid-skill, range of occupations and 
contributed to a squeezing of those in the middle 
of the income distribution. Alongside this decline in 
mid-skill jobs, the numbers in high skilled occupations 
has continued to grow (as technological innovation 
and globalisation act as complements, rather than 
substitutes, for these posts); and the plumbers, 
electricians and other personal service workers, that 
either cannot be automated/offshored, or grow in 
proportion with the high skilled jobs, have not suffered 
the same apparent ‘squeeze’. 
Many commentators make a case for some form 
of support to this wider squeezed middle, outside 
of those who are ‘key’ workers. However, the 
lack of empirical evidence on the benefits of such 
interventions, and the decline in demand for many 
‘mid-skill’ jobs, leads us to concentrate on the value 
of key workers in this group. This is an issue to which 
we return, starting in Section 3 with a study of the 
decline in mid-skill professionals in the Central, Inner 
and Outer regions of London over recent decades; 
and continuing in Section 4 with our consideration of a 
Personalised Rent (PerR) approach.
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3. Demographics and Housing in 
Central, Inner and Outer London
In Section 2 we draw on economic principles and a variety of research 
evidence to estimate the economic value of a DL development to the wider 
London economy. DL developments provide value, because they help alter 
the skills mix in the ‘local’ labour market, orienting towards key workers who 
have a higher value to London.
The value arising from provision of discounted rents 
derives from the fact that the individual works in 
the London area, and one may argue that it is not 
necessary for them to live in Central (or even Inner) 
London. In this section we consider the question of 
where one would wish to locate discounted rental 
accommodation, and what the relative costs and 
benefits are of locating across different locations.
As a first step in this, Section 3.1 considers the 
changing demographic makeup of those living in 
Central, Inner and Outer London regions between 
1994 and 2014, to see if there is an argument for 
location in one particular area, because of changes 
that have taken place within resident communities. 
Furthermore, we may expect analysis of changes in 
Central and Inner London over recent decades, to 
provide some idea of what to expect across the wider 
London region in coming decades, as the crisis in 
affordability continues to spread out from the centre. 
The first line of investigation considers the changing 
occupational distribution of London’s working resident 
population, between 1994 and 2014; and then moves 
on to track other demographic indicators between 
these years. 
Section 3.1 can be seen as one strand of investigation 
to tackle a key issue arising from the previous 2014 
study – why do we need to locate these workers in 
Central London, rather than in the wider Inner London, 
or even Outer London regions? Section 3.2 approaches 
this issue from another angle, by providing an overview 
of the offsetting costs and benefits from location in 
these different areas of London. 
3.1 The Changing Demographics of 
London’s Communities 
This section presents findings from an analysis of 
Quarterly Labour Force Survey data between 1994 
Quarter 1 and 2014 Quarter 4. Statistics presented in 
the following Figures are created by combining sample 
observations across the relevant four quarters for each 
year. The data are obtained under Special Licence from 
the UK Data Archive/ONS, and Table 5 shows how we 
re-categories the 32 London Local Authorities (LAs) 
into three groups. 
The three groupings of London Boroughs follow the 
categorisations of housing affordability as set out in the 
20th February (2015) Issue of Inside Housing. These 
are mostly in line with the ‘Central’, ‘Inner’ and ‘Outer’ 
London groupings usually adopted in studies of the 
Greater London area. The ‘Extreme Barriers: mainly 
Central London area’ covers the five main LAs, with 
the City of London dropped from analysis as there are 
not enough residents in the sample to allow analysis 
(broadly covering Zone 1 and much of Zone 2). We 
then have 14 LAs in the ‘High Barriers: Mainly Inner 
[excluding Central] London area’, broadly covering 
much of Zone 3; and then the ‘Lower Barriers: Mainly 
Outer London area’ considers 13 remaining LAs spread 
across Zones 4 to 6. The figures are created for all 
women aged between 18 and 59; and all men aged 
between 18 and 64 – this difference between men and 
women is becoming increasingly outdated, but tends to 
still be retained in labour market studies, as workers in 
older age groups have considered these as ‘retirement 
ages’ for the majority of their working lives.
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Table 5: Grouping Local Authorities  
according to the 'Buying Barrier'
Extreme Barriers: 
Mainly Central London
Camden
City of London
Hammersmith and Fulham
Islington
Kensington and Chelsea
Westminster, City of
High Barriers:  
Mainly Inner [excluding Central] London
Barnet
Brent
Brent
Hackney
Haringey
Kingston-upon-Thames
Lambeth
Lewisham
Merton
Richmond-upon-Thamesa
Southwark
Tower Hamlets
Waltham Forest
Wandsworth
Lower Barriers:  
Mainly Outer London
Barking and Dagenham
Bexley
Bromley
Croydon
Enfield
Greenwich
Harrow
Havering
Hillingdon
Hounslow
Newham
Redbridge
Sutton
Source: Inside Housing (2015), 20th February Issue
The initial aim is to understand the changing 
distribution of occupations and industries of 
those resident in these LAs, and also some key 
demographics, such as broad household type, 
between 1994 and 2014. Shares are expressed as a 
proportion of the total number of local residents or the 
number of local working residents.
For instance, Figures 9, 10 and 11 of the Appendix 
show that, if we consider the entire resident population 
of these three zones separately, there is not much 
difference in overall trends [in terms of the changing 
proportions of employed, unemployed and inactive 
between 1994 and 2014], but the absolute proportions 
do vary. Generally, there has been a small increase in 
the proportion who are employed; little change in the 
proportion who are unemployed, and a decline in the 
proportion of residents who are economically inactive, 
across all three zones. However, whilst the proportion of 
economically inactive in Outer London averages around 
23% for the period; and the Inner London region shows 
some decline from 26% to 23%; in Central London, the 
rate of economic inactivity averages just under 30% for 
most years between 1994 and 2014. 
This provides a backdrop to our discussions of other 
changes, as we now focus on those in employment, 
first considering the changing proportions of residents 
working in different professional groups across Central, 
Inner and Outer London. Comparisons over such a long 
time period face challenges, as the categorisations 
used in Standard Occupational Classifications (SOC) 
and Standard Industrial Classifications (SIC) change 
over the decades. However, even where this results 
in some potential discontinuities in the series, relative 
comparisons should remain valid, as any impacts should 
apply equally across the regions we are considering²⁰. 
²⁰ Readers should note that we have changes to the Standard 
Industrial Classification in 1992, 2003 and 2007; and changes 
to SOC in 1990 and 2000. During all such periods, we have 
used the conversion tables provided by ONS, but one cannot 
rule out some discontinuity. 
Figures 1 through to 3 of the Appendix set out the 
changing occupational distribution of working residents 
between 1994 and 2014, weighted to the relevant 
regional populations. As already suggested in previous 
discussions on ‘hollowing out’ of the labour market, 
our broad category of Managers, Professionals 
and Associate professionals has grown over recent 
decades. For instance, across the whole of Great 
Britain between 1994 and 2014, the proportion of 
workers in this category grew from around 35.8% 
to 45.9% of those in employment. In contrast, the 
proportion working in Administrative, Secretarial and 
Skilled Trades fell from 36.1% to 27.3%; and the 
numbers in our Personal Service Occupations category 
grew slightly, but fell in proportionate terms from 10% 
to 9% (those working in Plant, Machine or Elementary 
Occupations also fell from 18% to 17%). These are 
very broad amalgams of occupational groups, but 
they can be considered as representing a hierarchy of 
professions within the labour market. 
As we can see from Figures 1, 2 and 3 of the Appendix, 
London has experienced a ‘super-charged’ version 
of these trends. Figure 1 suggests that in 1994, 60% 
of Central London’s resident population was already 
made up of workers in the higher occupational 
categories (Managers, Professionals and Associate 
professionals), and by 2011 this had increased to 
73% (falling back a little since then). Alongside this, 
there is a decline in the proportion of workers in 
administrative and skilled trades, from 21% to 12%. 
The Central region is clearly moving towards a resident 
working population that is almost solely focused in this 
higher occupational category of workers; alongside 
a particularly pronounced proportion of inactive 
individuals (Figure 9).
Figures 2 and 3 identify similar trends for the Inner 
and Outer London areas, with increasing proportions 
of residents working in Higher level professions, 
and declining proportions of residents working in 
mid-skill administrative and skilled trades. As we 
might expect, the proportion of residents working in 
the highest occupational categories is increasing in 
all areas, but is still only 46% by 2014 in the Outer 
London area (very close to the proportion for the UK 
as a whole). In contrast, by 2014 these professionals 
make up 59% of working residents in Inner London. 
The category of workers in our mid-skill group declines 
from around 30% to 20% of working residents in the 
Inner London area; and from around 40% to 28% in 
the Outer London area, between 1994 and 2014. Over 
the period under study, Outer London changes from a 
region with almost the same proportions in our groups 
of Managers/Professionals and Administrative/skilled 
occupations, of around 40% each up to 1999 – but 
over the next 15 years the former group moves towards 
50%, and the latter drops below 30%. 
Figures 1 to 3 underline just how far London’s resident 
population has moved towards domination by the higher 
occupational categories. Is this a problem? A recent 
report from the IPPR (April 2016) considers the question 
of skills demand in London and notes that the sort of 
mid-skill occupations we see in decline in Figures 1, 2 
and 3 will still represent a substantial (approximate 25%) 
of all London job opportunities in coming decades. 
The IPPR report suggests that, ‘across all mid-skill 
occupations, we estimate that there is a shortage of 
22,000 people annually’. Whilst these occupations are 
in decline, they are still experiencing skills shortages, 
as the real wage associated with these jobs has 
stagnated, particularly in the face of rising costs of 
accommodation.
If we consider this issue in the context of discussions 
from Section 2.1 and Section 2.3, we may argue this is 
more ‘deficiency of skills supply’, rather than ‘market 
failure’. Whatever the exact nature of this challenge, there 
is an argument that the provision of discounted rental 
accommodation to a broader group of mid-skill workers 
(outside of our ‘key’ workers) has some value to London. 
However, there remains a large question-mark over how 
we would estimate this. Any additional value attributed 
to the provision of discounted rental accommodation to 
this wider group, would not be able to draw on research 
findings or economic principles. Given this, we retain an 
approach that estimates impacts only for key workers, as 
there is a clear market failure and we are able to draw on 
some key research findings. 
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Figures 1 to 3 underline how extreme the situation in 
Central London has become; but also how quickly the 
Inner and [to a lesser extent] Outer London areas are 
moving towards a similar situation. One may argue 
that, in an attempt to retain some amount of socio-
demographic diversity in Central London, we may 
wish to locate discounted rental accommodation here. 
However, we can clearly see that any concerns over 
occupational diversity also apply to the Inner London 
region; and given enough time, Outer London. Does 
consideration of the changing balance of employment 
amongst resident populations according to industry 
sector, alter this conclusion?
Figures 4, 5 and 6 of the Appendix describe the 
changing nature of employment amongst resident 
working populations, according to the sectors in which 
they work. To provide context, across Great Britain as a 
whole, there has been an increase in the proportion of 
those employed in our category of Finance, Insurance 
and Real Estate (FIRE)²¹ from 14% to around 19% 
between 1994 and 2014. The proportion employed in 
Public Services has risen from 25% to 30% (despite 
recent reversals ²²) ; and our category of Other Services, 
has risen slightly from around 5% to 6%. Trade and 
Catering (incl. hotels, catering, retail and wholesale) has 
stayed roughly constant at around 20%. Manufacturing 
has continued its long-term decline, falling from 20% of 
employment in 1994 to only 11% in 2014. 
Figure 4 of the Appendix suggests that the proportion of 
Central London residents working in the FIRE sector has 
increased by 10 percentage points over the last 20 years 
and is now more than double the proportion we see in the 
rest of the country. The proportion of residents working in 
public services is much lower than that seen in the rest of 
the UK, but has experienced little change over the period. 
In contrast, the proportion of working residents employed 
in Trade and Catering, experienced quite a pronounced 
decline from 19% to 10% between 1994 and 2011, but 
has recovered somewhat since then. 
As we would perhaps expect, Figure 5 of the Appendix 
identifies an average proportion of Inner London’s 
resident population engaged in the FIRE sector which 
is around 10 percentage points lower across all years; 
but with growth in this proportion at a similar rate 
to that seen in Central London, ending the period at 
30%. The proportion of residents working in the Public 
Sector is around five percentage points higher than we 
see in Great Britain as a whole, but remains roughly 
static across the entire period. The proportion of 
residents working in Trade and Catering is at a similar 
level to that seen in the Central region, and there has 
been a similar decline between 1994 and 2014. 
When considering the sectoral composition of resident 
working populations, it is Outer London where we 
observe some differences in trends; compared to those 
shared by Central and Inner London residents. Figure 
6 of the Appendix shows that the Outer London area 
accommodated a slightly lower, or roughly equivalent, 
proportion of public sector workers than the Inner and 
Central London regions respectively, in 1994. However, 
between 1994 and 2014 the Outer London area saw 
an increase in the proportion of residents working in 
this sector, from 23% to 28%. Whilst we observe some 
small decline in the proportions working in Trade and 
Catering, and growth in the proportion working in the 
FIRE sector; these trends are not as pronounced as 
those in the Inner and Central regions, and it is the 
decline in residents employed in manufacturing, from 
11% to 5%, that is most pronounced in this Outer area. 
Having described the changing occupational and 
sectoral focus of employment amongst the resident 
population between 1994 and 2014, we now consider 
change in key demographics. In terms of the London 
labour market, one may speculate on a (somewhat 
stereotypical) career lifecycle. It is suggested that 
much of London’s dynamism comes from the inflow 
of individuals in the early stages of their career, 
the majority of whom we may not expect to have 
dependents. These individuals may be willing to put 
up with relatively poor accommodation in early career, 
but at some point they face a decision of whether to 
continue living in London (for many this, ‘in or out’ 
decision comes at the point where they have children). 
We may then expect a proportion of this group to 
leave London and a proportion to stay – as the costs 
of accommodation have risen, we may expect a larger 
proportion of leavers.
This is very much speculation and there are a number 
of ways one could look at the flows of individuals in 
and out of London. However, whatever the specific 
perspective, it seems reasonable to suggest that the 
steep rise in costs of accommodation over recent 
years is likely to have had an impact on demographics 
of the resident population. In the representation above, 
we might expect a falling proportion of individuals 
amongst the resident population in Central London, 
aged over 40 who have dependent children, as costs 
of accommodation have risen. However, our analysis 
suggests the opposite and further disaggregation of 
this trend provides us with interesting insights. 
In fact, one of the most striking trends from our 
analysis of LFS data, is the rising proportion of Central 
London residents over the age of 40 with dependents 
[aged 18 or less], which increases from 12% to 
17% between 1994 and 2014 – a rise that has been 
particularly pronounced over the past decade ²³. In 
contrast, there has been a fall in the proportion of 
those aged between 18 and 30 without dependents, in 
the Central London resident population, from around 
30% to 25% between 1994 and 2014.
We need to be careful in our interpretation, as there is 
some variation in the figures for those aged under 30 
from year-to-year, but these are a reflection of trends in 
the rest of the country – over the same period, the UK 
has seen an increase in the proportion of individuals 
aged over 40 with dependents from 15% to 20%. We 
do not present the figures for Inner and Outer London, 
as they are similar to those in Central London.
This evidence seems to run counter to our 
‘stereotypical’ representation of London’s career 
lifecycle. In our stereotypical representation we might 
expect a falling proportion of individuals amongst the 
resident population in Central London, aged 40+ who 
have dependent children, as costs of accommodation 
have risen – even given the opposing trend apparent 
in the rest of the UK. However, separate analysis of 
higher, middle and lower occupations, shows that 
it is the higher occupations that are driving these 
trends, particularly in Central London. In Figure 7 of 
the Appendix, we can see that the proportion aged 
40+ with dependents, amongst Central London’s 
resident population who work in our category of 
‘Higher Occupations’, increased from 12.5% to 
around 20% over the period of study. In contrast, we 
see no such trend amongst our other occupational 
groups – for instance, whilst the proportions aged 40+ 
with dependents amongst Central London’s resident 
population who work in our category of ‘Middle 
Occupations’, varies a lot between 1994 and 2014, the 
proportion at the start and end of our 20-year period is 
virtually unchanged.
This difference seems to be driven by the fact that, 
as we move up the occupational ladder, the relevant 
pool of potential job applicants becomes much 
larger – at the top-end of the professional ladder, the 
pool from which applicants are drawn, is truly global. 
More importantly, these highly remunerated posts 
can afford to pay sufficient wages to attract workers 
and their families to live in London (and become part 
of the ‘local’ labour market). For instance, Figure 8 
of the Appendix shows how much of the increase in 
the proportion aged 40+ with dependents, amongst 
Central London’s resident population working in our 
category of ‘Higher Occupations’, has been driven by 
immigration. As the footnote to Figure 8 suggests, we 
²³ This analysis is not based on ‘households’, but still retains the ‘individual’ as the unit of analysis. As a result, some changes to 
family makeup could drive part of the changes we observe. However, as our analysis progresses this becomes less likely and we 
identify some key drivers of change that would be reflected in figures, even if we were to use the household as our unit of analysis.
²¹ This is a very broad category also containing Real Estate, Renting, Business Services, Law and other high-value added Professional Services. 
²² Also, readers should note that what constitutes ‘Public Service’ employment will have changed over the period, but our 
category remains constant. 
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are getting to the point where numbers are low and we 
must be careful in interpretation, but it is clear that the 
trend has been at least partly driven by an increase  
in 40+ foreign nationals in these higher occupations, 
with dependents ²⁴. 
Over the last 20 years, London has increasingly been 
drawing in workers at a later point in their career (aged 
40+ with dependents) to fill posts in highly remunerated 
occupations, and this has changed the demographics 
of Central London – higher occupations simply ‘buy in’ 
skills, alongside families, from overseas. Our analysis 
of these trends according to industry sector, shows 
that it is predominantly Finance, Business Services and 
other highly remunerated sectors that are driving this. In 
lower-level-to-middling occupations, the relevant pool of 
job applicants is still [mainly] London and the wider UK, 
but the wages on offer do not seem sufficient to entice 
workers to move to London with their families. Therefore, 
we see a more stereotypical pattern, especially amongst 
our public sector key workers. 
Whilst continuation of these trends is called into question 
by the Referendum result on 23rd June, it is important 
to note that our category of ‘European’ in Figure 8 is not 
limited to those countries in the European Union and 
some of the trend we identify is driven by immigration 
from the ‘Rest of the World’. This serves to emphasise 
just how reliant London is on foreign workers, especially 
in the highly remunerated occupations, and the 
demographic impacts this is having. 
3.2 Location in Central, Inner  
and Outer London
The arguments under Section 2.1 and calculations 
in Section 2.2 provide an estimate of the economic 
benefit to London from DL provision of accommodation 
to London’s key workers. In the previous section 
we describe some of the changing demographics 
of London’s resident population, in the Central, 
Inner and Outer regions; and one may consider the 
findings as providing some justification for location 
of developments providing discounted rents in the 
Central London area. It could be argued that Central 
London boroughs reap specific benefits from DL-type 
developments, as this helps them retain an amount of 
(socio-economic) diversity that is clearly being eroded.
However, whilst the Central region is experiencing 
particularly pronounced manifestations of these 
trends, they are also apparent in Inner London and, 
to a lesser extent, Outer London. There may be more 
of an argument for location in Central London on the 
grounds that one wishes to retain an amount of socio-
economic diversity amongst the resident population, 
but there is also a growing argument for location 
outside of the Central area on these grounds. To shed 
light on this debate, and to consider the offsetting costs 
incurred in achieving the estimated benefits in Section 
2.2, this section sets out some of the pros and cons of 
locating discounted rental accommodation in Central, 
Inner and Outer London. 
We take as our starting point, the £3.85 million benefit 
for 214 tenants across 141 units estimated in Section 
2.2. This is calculated by comparing the distribution of 
occupations in the DL development, with the distribution 
we would expect in a similar development located across 
Inner (including Central) London. As already suggested, 
comparison with Inner London has the potential to deflate 
our estimates of impact. Section 3.1 shows that the 
distribution of occupations in Central London is likely to 
contain fewer ‘key’ workers than in the wider Inner London 
area; so comparison of DL developments in Camden 
and Soho with an Inner London counterfactual, will likely 
identify a lower level of value added (because the impact 
we have on the occupational distribution [or skills mix] will 
be less pronounced). However, this estimate of £3.85m 
can be taken as an indication of the benefit derived from 
location across Inner/Central London; and we can now 
create estimates of the likely costs incurred in different 
locations, and compare this to the overall benefit.
To begin, consider the figures presented in Table 1 of 
Section 2.2. We can see that a rent of £177 per week for 
Studio flats in the King’s Cross development, is set at 
52% of the rent that an individual would be expected to 
pay for a similar flat on the open market. In this case we 
calculate the implied market rent as £342 and consider 
the difference of £165 (£342 minus £177 ²⁵) as the implicit 
subsidy – this is our estimate of the weekly ‘cost’ of 
providing this studio flat at a discount. For each category 
of unit in Table 1 (i.e. studio, 1 bedroom, 2 bedroom, 
3 bedroom) we can calculate the implied market rent, 
multiply this by the number of units, and calculate the 
annual revenue that would accrue from these rents under 
a market scenario. Using the figures in Table 1, this comes 
out at £3.8 million per annum. We then calculate the annual 
revenue that would accrue from rents charged by DL set 
out in Table 1, which is £1.8 million. The implied subsidy 
is therefore approximately £2 million and this gives an 
estimated benefit-to-cost ratio of 1.9 for DL developments. 
It is important to note that the costs used here, cover 
100% of the 214 DL residents; but the benefit is calculated 
for only 52% of residents who are key workers. Therefore, 
we can consider that the benefit-to-cost ratio for DL 
developments lies somewhere between 1.9 and 3.7. 
Anything over 2 is considered as ‘high value’ by the 
National Audit Office and, as flagged in previous 
discussions, decisions taken at various points in 
the process of estimation, suggest this is a cautious 
estimate of the range for a benefit-to-cost ratio arising 
from DL developments. However, the question we now 
need to ask is how much the cost (subsidy) aspect of 
this calculation changes when we vary the location of 
discounted rental developments.
The approach we take, is to first select three boroughs 
that have rental values close to the median for the 
Extreme, High and Lower areas (which are mostly in 
line with ‘Central’, ‘Inner’ and ‘Outer’ categorisations) 
across London, detailed in Table 5 (with the exception 
of Westminster, which is included for reference and 
has an average rental value higher than the average for 
Central London). Table 6 lists the boroughs selected for 
this analysis, together with estimated annual average 
rental values for the units under analysis. 
In each of these areas we carry out a process of 
calculation similar to that for the DL development 
detailed above. For instance, we use the estimated 
rental values in Table 6 to calculate the annual revenue 
that would accrue under a market scenario for the 
141 units detailed in Table 1, if they were located 
in Hammersmith and Fulham. More specifically, in 
Hammersmith and Fulham we estimate the average 
monthly market rent for a studio as £1,040. We can 
therefore estimate that the revenue from 25 studio flats 
[that are part of the King’s Cross Development], if they 
were located in Hammersmith and Fulham, would be 
£26,000 per month (or £312,000 p.a.). We can do the 
same for the 44 one-bedroom units; 65 two-bedroom 
units; and 7 three-bedroom units (that are part of the 
Hopkins Street and King’s Cross developments). Using 
this approach, we estimate the annual revenue that one 
would receive from these 141 DL units – if they were 
located in Hammersmith and Fulham and let at market 
rents – as £2.5 million. This compares to the figure of £3.8 
million that we estimate would accrue from renting the DL 
developments at market rents, in their current locations. 
The suggestion is that the implicit subsidy required 
for provision of equivalent discounted rental 
accommodation, located in Hammersmith and Fulham, 
is much lower than that required for location in the 
Central London areas of Westminster and Camden – 
and this is what one would expect. More specifically, the 
market rental scenario for 141 units in Central London 
(Westminster) would provide an estimated revenue 
of £3.8 million; the annual revenue in this location 
from discounted rents is just under £1.8 million; and 
²⁴ It is possible that some foreign nationals aged over 40 with dependents could be resident in Central London, but their dependents resident 
elsewhere. However, such a long term trend is unlikely to be driven solely by such workers.
²⁵ These figures do not include decimals and therefore are subject to a small amount of rounding error. We also create an indicator 
of market rents in our models that combine a range of sources, and use a weighted average across these different sources.
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²⁸ In these calculations, we assume the same distribution of our 214 residents across the 141 developments, in all location scenarios.
²⁹ We have run calculations that assume there is a travel cost for Westminster residents, assuming that they spend on average 18 mins 
in travel time, which comes from travelling from the centre to the edge of Westminster. This incurs a total travel cost of £790,000. 
However, this is more than offset by inclusion of calculations that accommodate two-way travel for the other areas of London - 
for instance, raising the estimate of opportunity cost from travel time by £950,000 for Hammersmith and Fulham.
therefore, the implied subsidy is approximately £2 
million. In Hammersmith and Fulham, the market rental 
scenario for a similar 141 units is estimated at £2.5m; 
and therefore, provision of discounted rents [at the same 
absolute level as those in Table 1], implies an estimated 
subsidy of approximately £700,000. This is quite a drop, 
but before completing our calculations we need to 
consider some of the direct offsetting costs to location 
further from the centre. 
One of the key issues from an individual worker’s 
perspective is the cost of commuting, in terms of 
direct costs, opportunity costs and wellbeing. For 
instance, Stutzer and Frey (2008) ²⁶ find that [for 
Germany], commuting reduces reported wellbeing by 
about ‘an eighth of the impact we expect from being 
unemployed’. This is quite high, as unemployment has 
one of the largest negative impacts on wellbeing in the 
literature. However, more recent work challenges these 
findings of a direct causal link between commuting 
distance and subjective wellbeing (Dickerson, Risa 
Hole and Munford, 2012) ²⁷. To ensure our study 
continues to err on the side of caution, we do not 
estimate any offsetting wellbeing impacts from location 
further out of the centre, limiting ourselves to direct 
and opportunity costs (in terms of lost productivity).
The approach we adopt is to define a point approximately 
central to the City of Westminster [Marble Arch] and 
measure all distances travelled (using the TfL Journey 
Planner) from the centre of the relevant borough, to this 
central point. In the case of Hammersmith and Fulham, 
the relevant annual tube season ticket for travel from 
the centre of the borough to Marble Arch is £1,296, and 
the time taken to travel one way is 33 minutes. Using 
a figure of £36 for average Gross Value Added (GVA) 
per workforce member, per hour in London (Office 
for National Statistics, 2015), we calculate the loss of 
productivity associated with this journey time. For the 
214 residents in our DL developments, these direct 
and opportunity costs of location in Hammersmith and 
Fulham amount to £1.2 million, offsetting the majority of 
our [£2 million minus £500,000] implicit subsidy savings, 
gained from moving location ²⁸. 
It is important to recognise that, in these calculations, 
we implicitly assume the location of tenants in current 
DL developments incurs no direct or opportunity cost of 
travelling. However, in the calculation of offsetting costs 
above, we are only taking into account the opportunity 
costs of travelling in one direction – an approach that is 
designed to offset this potential under-estimate ²⁹. Also, 
whilst we have set out the example for Hammersmith 
and Fulham, it is perhaps the comparison with the Inner 
London region that is most illuminating. Table 7 presents 
the outcomes from the process of calculation for the 
wider Inner and Outer London areas (based on the 
categories used in Table 5). 
The second column of Table 7 sets out our estimates 
of the average market rental scenario across three 
Inner London boroughs. We arrive at an estimate of 
approximately £2 million for the average annual market 
revenue accruing to our 141 units, if they were located in 
these boroughs. Across the three Outer London boroughs 
the figure averages £1.7 million. When setting out the 
example of Hammersmith and Fulham, we do not alter 
calculation of the subsidised scenario, as average market 
rents are always at a level higher than the discounted rent 
level. However, when we start to consider some of the 
Inner London market rents, and certainly those in Outer 
London, the DL subsidised rent is sometimes higher than 
the market rent. In these situations, the lower market rate 
is used in calculations, as in these situations we wish to 
represent a situation of zero subsidy. The specific rents 
used in these calculations, for each type of unit, are set 
out in the second half of Table 7. In cases where the 
subsidised rent figure is lower than that set out in Table 1, 
we have a situation where the average market rent for the 
region is lower than the subsidised rental value.
This approach allows us insight into the relative costs 
of location in different regions of London; and as we 
can see, the net impact on overall cost estimates 
is minimal, because of the offsetting direct and 
opportunity costs of transport. When we consider 
moving individuals to regions of the capital that have 
lower average costs of accommodation (and therefore 
require a smaller implied subsidy), there are significant 
offsetting [direct and opportunity] costs of commuting. 
This section serves to underline that, wherever we 
look across London, there is a problem of affordable 
living. In our attempts to clarify the location decisions 
facing those who provide discounted rents, we have 
underlined the lack of choice facing many workers, 
who are at risk of being squeezed out of the London 
labour market; and provided an additional rationale for 
DL developments locating in Central London.
This Section suggests that, the direct costs of travel, 
the opportunity cost of time whilst commuting, and 
the need to secure higher percentage returns in less 
affluent areas of London (i.e. compression of yields); 
tend to offset many of the savings from location of 
workers in cheaper, but less easily accessible, parts 
of London. Whichever area of London we consider the 
challenge remains the same, as any improvements in 
transport infrastructure, have an immediate impact 
on the costs of accommodation. Expanding transport 
infrastructure is essential to the continued success of 
London, but as soon as an area gains better transport 
links, the cost of housing rises, and locks out many of 
Table 6: Average monthly rents in Boroughs close to Central, Inner and Outer London medians
Central London Studio 1 Bedroom 2 Bedroom 3 Bedroom
Hammersmith and Fulham £1,040 £1,343 £1,712 £2,383
Westminster £1,300 £1,950 £2,708 £4,054
Camden £1,083 £1,517 £1,950 £2,817
Inner London
Ealing £802 £1,150 £1,375 £1,700
Haringey £825 £1,170 £1,408 £1,733
Kingston upon Thames £750 £995 £1,300 £1,600
Outer London
Redbridge £700 £850 £1,100 £1,400
Newham £750 £900 £1,200 £1,400
Sutton £650 £800 £1,099 £1,350
²⁶ Stutzer, A. and B. Frey (2008). Stress that doesn’t pay: The commuting paradox. Scandinavian Journal of Economics 110(2), 339–366.
²⁷ Dickerson, A., Risa Hole, A. and Munford, L. (2012), “The Relationship Between Well-Being and Commuting Re-Visited: Does 
the Choice of Methodology Matter?”, Sheffield University, Economic Research Paper Series, SERP Number: 2012016.
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the key workers on which the capital depends. 
Wherever we look in the Greater London area, there 
are limited opportunities for living and commuting, for 
workers who are essential to London economy and 
society, but whose value is not fully reflected in their 
wages. A more sustainable housing policy is needed 
across the whole of London, not just in the Central 
region. Recent headlines have focused on the question of 
how much new stock needs to be built, but this detracts 
from an equally pressing question – how do we utilise 
the current housing stock to ensure London continues to 
attract the diverse range of individuals it needs to thrive? 
We return to this issue in Section 5.
Table 7: The gains and losses from location in Inner and Outer London
Market rental scenario for the 141 units in Table 1 
Inner London (average across Haringey, 
Ealing and Kingston-upon-Thames)
Outer London (average across Newham, 
Redbridge and Sutton)
Studio, weekly market rent £213 £188
1 Bed, weekly market rent £259 £199
2 Bed, weekly market rent £323 £269
3 Bed, weekly market rent £362 £298
Total annual rental income £2,094,379 £1,719,106
DSF subsidised rental scenario for the 141 units in Table 1 
Inner London (average across Haringey, 
Ealing and Kingston-upon-Thames)
Outer London (average across Newham, 
Redbridge and Sutton)
Studio £177 £176
1 Bed
£233
£171
£194
£246
£189
£171
£187
£189
2 Bed
£296
£308
£190
£217
£303
£257
£257
£190
£217
£257
3 Bed £202
£234
£340
£202
£234
£280
Total annual rental income £1,760,963 £1,554,535
Cost of travel £1,915 £1,863
Time spent travelling 
(one way in minutes) 45 57
Lost productivity £6,044 £7,712
Total Direct and Opp Cost 
of Travel £1,687,155 £2,029,908
Difference in subsidy £56,436 -£135,624
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4. A Personalised Rent Model in 
Dolphin Living Developments
In Section 2.2 we have estimated the benefit 
associated with DL provision of discounted rental 
accommodation and in Section 3.2 the cost of 
achieving these benefits, in terms of the required 
implicit subsidy, across different London locations. In 
this section, we consider the implications for DL of 
achieving this benefit using a Personalised Rent model. 
The existing literature on Personalised Rents (for 
instance, Stone, 2006) ³⁰, tends to consider the concept 
when deciding which measures most accurately reflect 
levels of housing affordability. For instance, in Table 1 
we are implicitly measuring affordability with respect 
to market rents in the locality; and in Section 2.3 we 
have considered some of the problems facing those 
whose incomes place them within a ‘squeezed middle’ 
– here affordability is relative to the median income for 
a locality. Our aim is not to consider a Personalised 
Rents approach as another way of measuring 
affordability; but as a way of implementing ‘means 
tested’ rents. 
The approach being adopted by DL at the New Era 
Estate uses the Minimum Income Standard (MIS) 
developed by the Joseph Rowntree Foundation (with 
Loughborough University) ³¹ – referred to as ‘JRFMIS’ 
in the following calculations. For each household type, 
this allows DL to calculate the minimum household 
budget required to achieve an acceptable standard of 
living ³²; they can then compare this to the net income 
of the household; and a proportion of the remaining 
difference (or ‘Residual Income’) is set as the rent. In 
the New Era Estate, the starting point for consideration 
of this issue is very different to the situation in DL 
developments at Hopkins Street and King’s Cross. At 
New Era, Dolphin Living inherited a range of existing 
rent levels, and these are at a much greater discount 
to market rents (i.e. the implied subsidy is much 
higher), than those set out in Table 1. As a result, the 
distribution of tenants on the New Era Estate is very 
different to the distribution across the 141 units that 
form the focus of this report.
The approach in this section of the report is therefore 
to use existing information on the 141 tenant 
households that form the focus of our analysis; 
and estimate the revenue from rental income if a 
Personalised Rent approach were taken. Within the 
context of discussions from the previous section, this 
is simply an alternative estimate of the revenue arising 
in the ‘DL intervention scenario’. We then compare 
this to the DL intervention scenario under current 
approaches to renting, and consider the implications.
For each of the 141 households in Hopkins Street and 
King’s Cross, we utilise information on Household type 
and Household Income, and from this we calculate 
Net Household Income and the associated Minimum 
Income Standard. This gives us an estimate of the 
Residual Income and from this we can calculate the 
implied Personalised Rent (PerR). In practice, when 
we implement this approach, we face the question 
of what proportion of the residual income should be 
allocated to rent - the calculation is set out in Equation 
[i] below. We would clearly not wish to allocate all 
residual income to rent (X=100), as this would remove 
incentives for individuals to increase their income 
and progress in the labour market. The question is, 
what proportion of residual income would we wish to 
allocate to rent? As a starting point, we calculated the 
³⁰ Stone, M. E. (2006), “What Is Housing Affordability? The Case for the Residual Income Approach”, Housing Policy Debate, Vol. 17, Issue 1.
³¹ http://www.lboro.ac.uk/research/crsp/mis/
³² With the concept of what is ‘acceptable’ identified as part of a programme of research carried out with members of the public 
by Loughborough University researchers. 
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rental income that would likely accrue if rents were set 
for each household at 75% of Residual Income. Our 
approach allows the Personalised Rent to be set at a 
level lower than that currently charged to each of the 
141 households in a DL unit; but 75% was chosen, 
as it provided an estimated rent close to that already 
being charged by DL, or slightly above, for the majority 
of tenants.
[i] Personalised Rent (PerR) = [X% * (Net Household 
Income – JRFMIS)]
      
From these initial calculations, we estimate a 
rental income of £2.45m, from 141 household units 
(containing 214 individuals). However, we find this 
approach can produce large variations across 
households, that are perhaps less desirable – as we 
move up the income distribution, 75% of residual 
income can become a very large amount in absolute 
terms and would still be expected to produce strong 
disincentive effects in the labour market. As a result, 
we take an approach to allocation of Personalised 
Rents that is something of a combination of the New 
Era approach, and that set out in Equation [i]. 
First, Equation [ii] describes the approach that DL 
are adopting at New Era, where the Residual Income 
is calculated as the Net Household Income, minus a 
combination of the Minimum Income Standard and 
the Existing Rent being charged. The Residual Income 
in this case, is that which remains having taken into 
account all living costs, including the existing rent; and 
half of this figure is added to the existing rent, to arrive 
at the Personalised Rent (PerR). If this calculation 
results in a positive Residual Income for the household 
in question, then Equation [ii] determines the rent set ³³. 
This approach, agreed with existing New Era tenants, 
reduces the variability we can expect across the 
income distribution – better retaining incentives in the 
labour market. 
 [ii] PerR = Existing New Era Rent + [Net Hsehold 
Income – (JRFMIS + Existing New Era Rent)]
However, in order to transfer this approach to a more 
general setting, we must propose a ‘Base Rent’ figure 
to replace the ‘Existing New Era Rent’ in Equation 
[ii]. The figure of £175 p.w. in equation [iii] has been 
chosen as it is the rent that is just affordable (using 
MIS living costs) to a household with a net income of 
approximately £20,000 p.a. – that is, a single working-
age adult earning a gross income of around £25,000 
per annum (the approximate point in the earnings 
distribution [currently £26,000], above which benefits 
are capped). Alternatively, one can think of this as 
a working-age couple, each earning the London 
Living Wage of around £18,300 p.a. Those with a 
net household income below £20,000 per annum are 
supported by Universal Credit and are not currently 
targeted for support by DL (an issue to which we return 
in the concluding section of this report). 
[iii] PerR = Base Rent of £175 + [Net Household Income 
– (JRFMIS + base rent)]
Using Equation [iii] as our basis for calculation, we 
estimate a revenue from Personalised Rents of around 
£2.19 million ³⁴. This compares to the £1.9 million 
revenue that we have already calculated in Section 3.2, 
under current DL approaches to rent setting; and the 
£2.45 million figure that we arrive at when setting the 
rent at 75% of the total Residual Income. To give an 
idea of what this means, we calculate the average rent 
[across our four types of accommodation unit] in King’s 
Cross and Hopkins Street, that is needed to meet this 
revenue of £1.9 million, with 141 units. In this context, 
the extra £290,000 gained in revenues under the PerR 
model [£2.19m minus £1.9m], implies that we could 
provide (on average) an extra 17 units in the King’s 
Cross Development and 6 in Hopkins Street. Such 
additional units are possible, because we are using 
an approach that better fits the rent of an individual 
to their ability to pay. In these calculations we have 
factored into the Personalised Rental scenario, a cost 
for administration and the details of this can be found 
in the Appendix. 
Figure 12 gives some idea of where this extra revenue 
comes from, by subtracting the existing rent paid by 
each DL household 
in the King’s Cross 
development, from the 
PerR they would pay 
under the model set 
out in Equation [iii]. 
Figure 12 suggests 
that Equation [iii] still 
retains a progressive 
approach to rent setting, 
with higher household 
incomes within each 
unit-type incurring a 
greater additional rent 
under the PerR model. 
Most of those renting 
Studios would pay less than £50 per week extra, but 
two households on incomes of £50,000+ in these units 
would pay between £150 and £200 more. 
A similar pattern is evident for the remainder of 
unit types in Figure 12, with a majority of tenant 
households paying an additional £50 to £100 per week 
under the PerR model; but with some households on 
higher incomes in the one-bedroom developments 
paying significantly more, and a 
significant number in the two-
bedroom units paying very close 
to the rent already set. As we 
move from Studios to the largest 
two-bedroom units, we observe 
less variation in the difference 
between existing rents and those 
implied by a PerR approach. 
Comparison of Figures 12 and 
13 underlines the difference 
between tenants in Hopkins St 
and King’s Cross, with a much 
higher proportion paying a lower 
rent under the PerR model in the 
former development, when compared to their current 
rent. Because there are many more categories of 
unit, the pattern is less obvious, but we still have a 
clearly progressive approach within each unit type. 
The Hopkins Street development shows clearly where 
the benefits of a Personalised Rent model lie, as 
there is the potential for significantly improved social 
outcomes, from matching rents to ability to pay.
³³ In New Era, Dolphin Living have a ‘collar’ (or minimum rent) set at the current New Era rent + (CPI+1%).
³⁴ Here we set a collar of the Base Rent, but this does not have any impact for the current income distribution of tenants.
Figure 12: Estimated additions to rental payments under  
a PerR model, by Household Income: King’s Cross
Figure 13: Estimated additions to rental payments under a PerR model,  
by Household Income: Hopkins St.
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The calculations in this section of the report are very 
much a first step in considering the wider implications 
of a Personalised Rent model for working Londoners 
in the squeezed middle. The underlying challenge that 
becomes apparent from our calculations, is the need 
to obtain a balance between (i) retaining incentives to 
effort in the labour market and adopting an approach 
that is acceptable to higher income earners; whilst 
(ii) allowing sufficient revenues to provide discounted 
rents to those who have the greatest need. However, 
this is an approach that DL is already implementing on 
the New Era Estate and the response of tenants has 
been very positive, so this is not a wholly ‘academic’ 
exercise. Much more work needs to be done if this 
approach is to be rolled out generally, but there is a 
potential for this approach (alongside others) to help 
tackle London’s housing challenge. 
It is worth flagging some of the key issues that still 
need to be tackled if this approach were to be used 
more generally: 
• The approach we have taken for existing DL 
tenants reduces the variability in impacts across 
the income distribution, mainly because of the 
addition of a ‘base rent’. As we move up the 
household income distribution, our approach (in 
Equation [iii]) acts to reduce the residual income 
given over to ‘personalised rent’ by a ‘fixed’, and a 
‘proportionate’ amount. As incomes become much 
larger, there would still be the problem that, even 
with this absolute and proportionate reduction, 
we would observe particularly high personalised 
rents. This is not an insurmountable problem, as 
one can set the fixed and proportionate amounts 
in discussion with tenants, based on the income 
distribution under consideration.
More importantly, this line of reasoning leads to 
some direction on another key issue – over what 
sort of income bands would we envisage utilising a 
PerR approach for London’s working households? 
At the lower end of the household income 
distribution, we are inclined to follow the general 
direction of the Resolution Foundation, with those 
obtaining a large proportion of their income from 
benefits, requiring some other form of intervention. 
At the top end of the income distributions outlined 
in Figures 12 and 13, we have a situation that 
is essentially self-regulating – if the income of a 
household implied a PerR very close to market 
rents (perhaps 90% or above), then they would not 
qualify for the development. For instance, the GLA 
limit intermediate rent and affordable rent to 80% 
of the market rent, and limit those who benefit from 
subsidy to households with incomes of £90,000 
per annum or lower.
• This last point brings us to consideration of Section 
106 agreements, which we argue could become 
simpler and remove many of the ‘cliff edges’ implied 
by existing agreements, under a PerR approach. 
Specifically, Section 106 agreements currently 
specify both income bands and discounted rental 
values – they essentially specify both stages of 
a two-stage process and as a result, produce 
anomalies. For instance, we may find that a 
household in extreme need of affordable housing, 
that DL would wish to accommodate in a two-
bedroom unit; does not fall within the income band 
for a three-bedroom unit, and if the two-bedroom 
units are exhausted; there is no potential to house 
them. A PerR approach has some potential to 
overcome these challenges, as one can more clearly 
define the first stage of this process and allow some 
flexibility in the second stage. 
Using an agreed formula (along the lines of 
Equation [iii]), Section 106 agreements could 
specify those who qualify for discounted rental 
accommodation, according to their circumstances 
(Residual Income). Having passed this first stage, 
which would ensure that those most in need were 
being accommodated, a more detailed version of 
Equation [iii] would be able to specify a number of 
Personalised Rent options open to the household 
across the different units. The ‘average’ base rent 
used in the first stage, could be varied according 
to the specific accommodation unit being 
considered by the household in the second stage 
– presenting them with a variety of options, that 
traded-off a higher Personalised Rent, but a lower 
proportion of residual income retained. Again, 
much work needs to be done, but the PerR model 
has potential to overcome some of the existing 
limitations of Section 106 agreements. 
• Such an approach would also help clarify the 
dynamic nature of the decision process around the 
letting of units following the initial allocation, as a 
result of tenant turnover. Section 106 agreements 
would dictate (to a large extent) the sort of 
household mix initially accommodated across 
new developments and would also provide similar 
guidance as units become available (working 
to ensure a similar distribution of households, 
according to Residual Income).
To give an idea of the sort of issues that would 
need to be considered using such an approach, 
assisting a number of people who could afford 
(under the PerR model) to pay 95% of market rent, 
would enable DL to assist more households on 
lower incomes, than would currently be possible. 
However, in extremis this would see a polarised 
mix of housing incomes, with a proportion of 
tenants on 95% rents and many on only 10% 
rents. DL would therefore wish to set some 
parameters about the desired mix, informing a 
more intelligent cap/collar.
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5. Conclusions and Policy 
Recommendations 
The approach adopted in this report allows us insight 
into the relative costs of location in different regions 
of London. When we consider moving individuals to 
regions of the capital that have lower average costs 
of accommodation (and therefore require a smaller 
implied subsidy), there are significant offsetting [direct 
and opportunity] costs of commuting. This report 
serves to underline that, wherever we look across 
London, there is a problem of affordable living. In our 
attempts to clarify the location decisions facing those 
who provide discounted rents, we have underlined the 
lack of choice facing many workers, who are at risk of 
being squeezed out of the London labour market. 
The pattern we describe is inevitable in many ways, 
for a city that will hopefully continue to thrive. It is hard 
to argue for the use of extensive subsidies to offset 
this for the broad swathe of our ‘squeezed middle’. 
However, for those key workers who are essential 
to the continued economic success of London, but 
under-valued because of a market failure, there is a 
strong economic case for something to be done. This 
will go some way to retain an amount of diversity in 
this increasingly segregated city, but more importantly 
it will help ensure that the success continues. A city 
which struggles to attract good quality teachers, 
nurses, creatives, software analysts and others, will 
find its success under threat. 
The Personalised Rent calculations in this report 
are very much a first step in considering the wider 
implications of such a model for working Londoners. 
The underlying challenge that becomes apparent 
from our calculations, is the need to obtain a balance 
between (i) retaining incentives to effort in the labour 
market and adopting an approach that is acceptable 
to higher income earners; whilst (ii) allowing sufficient 
revenues to provide discounted rents to those who 
have the greatest need. However, this is an approach 
that DL is already implementing on the New Era Estate 
and the response of tenants has been very positive, so 
this is not a wholly ‘academic’ exercise. 
More work needs to be done if the PerR approach 
is to be rolled out generally. However, there is clear 
potential for the adoption of a PerR model to allow 
for the provision of more subsidised housing, without 
negatively impacting on the affordability of existing/
planned housing. A common theme throughout 
the report is the necessity for an expansion of the 
approaches used in London to tackle problems of 
accommodation, and this report is a first step in 
tackling the lack of discussion around a Personalised 
Rents approach, as part of the raft of measures 
considered. If we are going to support a thriving city, 
then key workers need to be better accommodated; 
and the implication from our calculations, is that 
a Personalised Rent approach may be particularly 
effective in achieving this outcome at minimum cost.
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Appendix
Figures 1 to 11
Figure 1: Changing occupational distribution of the resident working population, in Central London between 
1994 and 2014
Source: Quarterly Labour Force Survey, 1994 Quarter 1 to 2014 Quarter 4
Figure 2: Changing occupational distribution of the resident working population, in Inner London  
(excluding Central) between 1994 and 2014
Source: Quarterly Labour Force Survey, 1994 Quarter 1 to 2014 Quarter 4
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Figure 5: Changing industry sector of the resident working population, in Inner London (excluding Central) 
between 1994 and 2014
Source: Quarterly Labour Force Survey, 1994 Quarter 1 to 2014 Quarter 4
Note: FIRE stands for finance, insurance, real estate and business. People working in agriculture and mining have been dropped 
from the sample.
Figure 6: Changing industry sector of the resident working population, in Outer London between 1994 and 2014
Source: Quarterly Labour Force Survey, 1994 Quarter 1 to 2014 Quarter 4
Figure 3: Changing occupational distribution of the resident working population, in Outer London between 
1994 and 2014
Source: Quarterly Labour Force Survey, 1994 Quarter 1 to 2014 Quarter 4
Figure 4: Changing industry sector of the resident working population, in Central London between 1994 and 2014
Source: Quarterly Labour Force Survey, 1994 Quarter 1 to 2014 Quarter 4
Note: FIRE stands for finance, insurance, real estate and business. People working in agriculture and mining have been dropped 
from the sample
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Figure	3:	Changing	occupational	distribution	of	the	resident	working	
population,	in	Outer	London	between	1994	and	2014
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Figure 9: The changing proportions of Central London residents who are Employed, Unemployed or Inactive
Source: Quarterly Labour Force Survey, 1994 Quarter 1 to 2014 Quarter 4
Figure 10: The changing proportions of Inner London residents (excluding Central) who are Employed, 
Unemployed or Inactive
Source: Quarterly Labour Force Survey, 1994 Quarter 1 to 2014 Quarter 4
Figure 7: The changing makeup of Central London's resident population in higher occupations according to 
Age Group, with dependents aged under 18
Source: Quarterly Labour Force Survey, 1994 Quarter 1 to 2014 Quarter 4
Figure 8: Shares of all foreign, European and Rest of the World among 40+ with dependents, in higher 
occupations who reside in Central London
Source: Quarterly Labour Force Survey, 1994 Quarter 1 to 2014 Quarter 4
Note: In order to construct Figure 8, we have had to impute values for some years in the series, where the values were blanked 
because of low cell count. The value for 1997 is replaced with the average between 1996 and 1998; the 2001 value with the 
average between 2000 and 2002; and the 2004 value with the average between 2003 and 2005
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Figure	9:	The	changing	Proportions	of	Central	London	Residents	who	are	Employed,	
Unemployed	or	Inactive	
Share	of	Employed Share	of	Unemployed Share	of	Inactive
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Figure	10:	The	changing	Proportions	of	Inner	London	Residents	(excluding	
Central)	who	are	Employed,	Unemployed	or	Inactive	
Share	of	Employed Share	of	Unemployed Share	of	Inactive
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Figure 11: The changing proportions of Outer London residents who are Employed, Unemployed or Inactive
Source: Quarterly Labour Force Survey data between 1994 Quarter 1 and 2014 Quarter 4
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Figure	11:	The	changing	Proportions	of	Outer	London	Residents	who	are	
Employed,	Unemployed	or	Inactive	
Share	of	Employed Share	of	Unemployed Share	of	Inactive
Cost of administering Personalised 
Rent means tests 
The cost for assessing 89 households on the New Era 
Estate was approximately £16,000 inc. VAT (around 
£180 per property). This was the cost of hiring a team 
of officers and a manager from an external contractor, 
to conduct home visits, complete the proforma, check 
evidence, administer the data collection and analysis, 
and calculate rents. A large proportion of this cost is 
unique to setting personalised rents, owing to the need 
to set rents on an individual basis. Additionally, much 
of this cost was associated with the comprehensive 
approach taken as a result of the high profile estate on 
which it was implemented, and because it was the first 
attempt to implement such a policy.
Rent-setting is an existing annual task carried out by 
landlords. Whilst a rent must be set for each property 
(and therefore a formula-based calculation or a market-
valuation pegged figure must be generated) this is 
done without the need to contact, gather evidence 
from, or means test, the individual tenant. Therefore, 
we can consider that around 95% of the £16,000 costs 
associated with the New Era process, were associated 
with tasks unique to setting personalised rents. In 
contrast, it is not entirely necessary to visit tenants 
in order to conduct the means test and a registered 
provider typically visits 10% of its property a year in 
order to verify the details of the household, and this 
means-test is a natural successor to these Tenancy 
Verification Visits. 
In line with other decisions made in this report, 
we err on the side of caution and assume that the 
Personalised rental scenario incurs a cost of £16,000 
every three years for each 89 properties (as this is the 
period of tenancy renewal). Clearly some tenants will 
terminate their tenancy before completing the three-
year fixed term, prompting a new letting and means 
test (and associated cost). However, predicted churn 
is just under 10% p.a. and our adoption of a figure of 
£16,000 every three years, which we argue is an over-
estimate of costs, incorporates this aspect. 

